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Control of the Attorney-Client Privilege After Mergers
and Other Transformational Transactions: Should
Control of the Privilege Be Alienable by Contract?
Grace M. Giesel*
In recent years, parties to mergers and other transformational
transactions have begun inserting into their deal documents provisions
allocating post-transaction control of the attorney-client privilege for pretransaction communications. The controller of the privilege is the person or
entity who decides whether to assert the privilege or, rather, to waive it.
Commonly, representatives of the target entity in a merger or representatives
of an asset seller in a transformational sale want post-transaction control of
the privilege for pre-transaction communications relating to the transaction.
They want control of the privilege so the surviving entity cannot access or
use those communications against the pre-transaction representatives in
post-transaction litigation.
Though contractual privilege allocation provisions are now common in
transformational transactions, the question of whether these provisions
should be enforceable has garnered little attention. If the attorney-client
privilege were an asset such as a piece of equipment, there would be no
question that the asset could be allocated by contract. But the attorney-client
privilege is not a typical asset; it represents a careful balance of public goals
and policy and as such is not an asset of any one actor. The precise bounds
of the privilege are set by courts and legislatures. They have determined the
balance of the societal interest in a justice system that effectively and
efficiently finds the truth and the secondary but important interest behind the
privilege in assuring that clients fully disclose all matters to their attorneys
so that they can have the best possible representation and abide within the
law. When private parties contract to allocate control of the privilege, those
parties contract to maximize their collective good, but in doing so they are
resetting the bounds of the privilege in a way that overrules the balance set
so carefully by courts and legislatures—a balance set with full consideration
of societal interests. When dealing with claims of privilege based on common
interest, courts have not allowed parties to dictate the existence of a common
* Bernard Flexner Professor of Law and Distinguished Teaching Professor, Louis D. Brandeis
School of Law, University of Louisville.
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interest if, in fact, no common interest as determined by the court, exists.
These courts have not allowed parties to reshape the privilege by contract.
Similarly, control of the privilege for an entity should not be contractually
alienable apart from control of an entity. As courts refuse to honor
contractual extensions of statutes of limitations before a cause of action
accrues because of the public interest at issue, so too should courts refuse to
enforce contractual privilege allocation provisions. Control of the privilege
for an entity should not be contractually alienable apart from control of the
entity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The question of control of the attorney-client privilege for an entity’s
pre-transaction communications with counsel often arises in litigation after
a merger or sale of assets or other arguably transformational transaction.1
The answer to the question can often be dispositive of the entire litigation,
especially when representatives of the target entity or asset seller and the
surviving entity or asset purchaser are adverse in the subsequent litigation.
Even when the parties to the transaction are not adversaries in the litigation,
their interests may not coincide.
Where control of the privilege for pre-transaction communications
resides after a transformational transaction may not be clear as a matter of
law as a result of the form that the transaction takes2 or because there is a
dearth of precedent in the relevant jurisdiction or simply a lack of clarity with
regard to that precedent.3 In other situations, the law may be clear but the
parties to the transaction would rather not have the result dictated by that
law. In particular, the representatives of the target or asset seller may not
want the survivor entity or asset purchaser to control the privilege for pretransaction, transaction-related communications—a result dictated by the
law of Delaware, for example.4 Given this state of the law, parties have
begun to include in transaction contracts privilege allocation provisions in
transaction contracts for pre-transaction communications between the target
or asset seller and counsel, especially with regard to transaction-related
communications.5
May parties, by contract, direct who controls the privilege for pretransaction communications between the target or asset seller after a
transformational transaction? Is control of the privilege for an entity
alienable apart from entity control?
The attorney-client privilege is a careful balance of public goals and
policy. Courts and legislatures have set the precise bounds of the privilege
by determining the right balance of society’s interest in a justice system that

1
See, e.g., Newspring Mezzanine Capital II, L.P. v. Hayes, No. 14-1706, 2014 WL
6908058 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2014) (in a post-merger setting, the sellers of a controlling interest
of the target entity asserted that they had the right to control the attorney-client privilege
regarding pre-merger communications with counsel to the target); Novack v. Raytheon Co.,
No. SUCV201302852BLS1, 2014 WL 7506205 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 2014) (former inhouse counsel to the target entity asserted he was the shareholder representative of the target
and controlled the attorney-client privilege for pre-merger communications). As to what
qualifies as a transformational transaction such that control of the privilege might transfer by
operation of law, see infra Part III.B.
2
See infra Part III.C.
3
See infra section Part IV.B.
4
See discussion of Delaware precedent infra Part IV.C.
5
See infra Part V.
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effectively and efficiently finds the truth and the secondary but important
interest behind the privilege in assuring that clients fully disclose all matters
to their attorneys so that they can have the best possible representation and
abide within the law. When private parties contract to allocate control of the
privilege, those parties are contracting to maximize their collective good,6
but in doing so they are resetting the bounds of the privilege in a way that
circumvents the balance set so carefully by courts and legislatures. When
dealing with claims of privilege based on common interest, courts have not
allowed parties to dictate the existence of a common interest if, in fact, no
common interest as determined by the court existed. Courts have not
allowed parties to reshape the privilege by contract. Similarly, control of the
privilege for an entity should not be contractually alienable apart from
control of an entity. As courts refuse to honor contractual extensions of
statutes of limitations before a cause of action accrues because of the public
interest at issue, so, too, courts should refuse to enforce contractual privilege
allocation provisions. Control of the privilege for an entity should not be
contractually alienable apart from control of the entity.7
After a merger or asset sale or other transformational transaction,
litigation may arise from the transaction itself or may arise from actions
taken well before the transformational transaction. Perhaps the survivor
entity or asset buyer concludes that it paid more for less than it intended.
Perhaps the survivor or asset buyer discovers that all is not as the
representatives of the target or asset seller represented such that the price
paid was excessive. Or perhaps the survivor entity or asset buyer concludes
that the representatives of the target or asset seller did not disclose all the
information that should have been disclosed in such a transaction. The
survivor entity or asset buyer in these circumstances then may seek to hold
accountable pre-transaction representatives of the target or asset seller or the
entity itself in an effort to recover what it perceives as ill-gotten gains.8
6
The members of the management of an entity are the decision-makers for the entity.
These individuals must make these decisions in light of their fiduciary duty to act in the best
interests of the entity. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343,
348–49 (1985) (“The managers, of course, must exercise the privilege in a manner consistent
with their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation and not of themselves
as individuals.”).
7
See infra Part VI.
8
For example, in In re Lyondell Chemical Co., No. 16-cv-518, 2016 WL 5818591
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2016), the trustee sued former shareholders of the target, Lyondell. The
survivor, Lyondell Basell, entered bankruptcy thirteen months after the transformational
transaction. The trustee in bankruptcy claimed that the combination was a fraudulent transfer
on actual and constructive theories. See also In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig.,
818 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2016) (bankruptcy trustee sued former shareholders of target/seller
claiming fraudulent transfer); FdG Logistics LLC v. A&R Logistics Holdings, Inc., 131 A.3d
842 (Del. Ch. 2016), aff’d, 2016 WL 5845786 (Del. Sept. 30, 2016) (After a merger
transaction, the survivor sued the target’s shareholders claiming that the target had engaged
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Similarly, a third party might seek a recovery for actions of the target or
seller entity taken before the transformational transaction and unrelated to
it.9
If litigation arises between the survivor or asset purchaser entity and
representatives of the target or asset seller, the survivor’s or asset purchaser’s
ability to access and use in the litigation pre-transaction communications
between the target or asset seller and its counsel relating to the
transformational transaction is extraordinarily important. If the survivor or
asset purchaser controls the privilege, that party has access and may use
communications that go to the heart of the litigation. Indeed, the
determination of who controls the privilege may, in effect, decide the entire
matter. For example, if the survivor claims that representations made by the
target were not true or that the target concealed important information from
the survivor, communications between the target and its counsel that
occurred in the lead-up to the transaction and relate to those issues may prove
the claim.10 Such communications might logically be a good place to find a
smoking gun.
Similarly, in the context of litigation instituted by third parties, the
survivor or asset purchaser may choose to waive the privilege though the
waiver might have serious negative repercussions for the pre-transaction
representatives of the target or asset seller. A survivor or asset purchaser
controlling the privilege may have very different motivations regarding
asserting or waiving the privilege for pre-transaction communications
between the representatives of the target or asset seller and counsel.11

in illegal activities before the merger and had not disclosed these improper dealings. In
addition, the survivor claimed the target had engaged in fraud by its misrepresentations and
omissions when dealing with the survivor in the lead-up to the merger.).
9
See, e.g., Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. NWI-I, Inc., 240 F.R.D. 401 (N.D. Ill.
2007) (declaratory action by insurer to determine coverage for remediation costs incurred by
the Environmental Protection Agency and state agencies).
10
See, e.g., Great Hill Equity Partners IV, LP v. SIG Growth Equity Fund I, LLLP, C.A.
No. 7906-VCG, 2014 WL 6703980 (Del. Ch. Nov. 26, 2014). The plaintiffs acquired the
target by merger. After the transaction, the plaintiffs brought suit, claiming that the target and
others had made fraudulent representations to the plaintiffs so that the merger would occur.
Id. at *1. Following an earlier determination that the survivor controlled the privilege with
regard to all communications of the target that occurred before the merger, see Great Hill
Equity Partners IV, LP v. SIG Growth Equity Fund I, LLLP, 80 A.3d 155 (Del. Ch. 2013),
including communications relating to the merger transaction itself, the court refused the
defendants’ motion to dismiss. Id. The court noted that the plaintiffs had access to privileged
communications between the target and its counsel in drafting the complaint and that it had a
right to access and rely upon such communications. Id. at *18.
11
The management of the survivor or purchasing entity should make decisions for the
entity that are in the best interests of the entity. See CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348–
49 (1985) (stating that representatives of the target or asset seller may be focused on selfpreservation).
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As a general proposition, courts have held that control of an entity’s
attorney-client privilege relating to pre-transaction communications passes
with control of the entity. In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Weintraub,12 the United States Supreme Court stated: “The parties also agree
that when control of a corporation passes to new management, the authority
to assert and waive the corporation’s attorney-client privilege passes as
well.”13 In the years after Weintraub, this basic concept that control of the
attorney-client privilege for pre-transaction and post-transaction
communications passes with control of an entity in a transformational
transaction has been widely accepted without opposition as a matter of
federal14 as well as state law,15 though there has been much discussion in the
courts about the types of transactions that create change of control of the
target sufficient to trigger the transfer of the privilege.16
When the issue is the narrow one of control of the privilege for pretransaction, transaction-related communications after a transformational
transaction, arguably two approaches have emerged. Delaware, a state
whose law is extraordinarily influential in corporate transactional practice,17
has spoken on the issue and has clarified that the basic rule of Weintraub
applies; the survivor entity or asset purchaser controls the privilege with
regard to all communications of the target or asset seller even when the
survivor is suing the representatives of the target with regard to the
transformational transaction. The Delaware Court of Chancery, in Great
Hill Equity Partners IV, LP v. SIG Growth Equity Fund I, LLLP,18 followed
the Weintraub rule of general application, holding that, as an incident to
control of the entity, the survivor gains control of the privilege of the target
for all pre-transaction communications, including those relating to the

12

Id.
Id. at 349. While the Court speaks in terms of control of the privilege “pass[ing],” the
theory is that the privilege continues to exist because the entity continues to exist. So the
privilege simply continues as a part of the entity while the management of the entity changes.
Id.
14
See, e.g., In re: Optuminsight, Inc., No. 2017-116, 2017 WL 3096300 (Fed. Cir. July
20, 2017) (applying rule as a matter of federal law); U.S. v. Askins, No. 3:13-cr-00162, 2016
WL 4039204 (M.D. Tenn. July 28, 2016) (same).
15
See, e.g., Pittsburgh History & Landmarks Found., 161 A.3d 397 (Pa Commw. Ct.
Apr. 21, 2017) (applying the rule as a matter of Pennsylvania law); Las Vegas Sands v. Eight
Jud. Dist. Ct., 331 P.3d 905 (Nev. 2014) (applying the rule as a matter of Nevada law).
16
Often courts evaluate whether a sale of assets creates a change of control. See
discussion infra Part III.C.
17
See generally John C. Coates IV, Managing Disputes Through Contract: Evidence
from M&A, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 295 (2012); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex
Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements,
59 VAND. L. REV. 1975 (2006).
18
80 A.3d 155 (Del. Ch. 2013).
13
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transaction.19 The court then defined the Weintraub rule as a default rule that
the parties to the transaction could have circumvented by clearly stating that
control of the privilege does not travel to the survivor.20
New York, another state whose law is extraordinarily influential in
corporate transactional practice,21 has also addressed the question of control
of the privilege for pre-transaction, transaction-related communications of
the target or asset seller after a transformational transaction. In Tekni-Plex,
Inc. v. Meyner & Landis,22 the court placed control of the attorney-client
privilege for pre-transaction communications of the target or asset seller after
a transformational transaction with the survivor or asset purchaser
generally.23 But for transaction-related communications, the court carved
out an exception. In this narrow situation, the court held that the privilege
does not travel to the survivor.24 The reach of this opinion is unclear,
however, because the Tekni-Plex court relied to some extent on the fact that,
in the court’s opinion, the parties had agreed in the merger documents that
the “rights of the acquired corporation, . . . relating to the transaction would
remain independent from and adverse to the rights of [the survivor]”.25 Yet,
the Tekni-Plex opinion contains no indication that the parties specifically
addressed in their deal documents the control of the attorney-client
privilege.26 Importantly, however, the Tekni-Plex court’s mention of the
agreement shows that the court shared the opinion of the Great Hill court
that parties can allocate control of the privilege by contract.
The result of Weintraub, Great Hill, and Tekni-Plex is that parties
entering into transactions may not be able to determine where control of the
attorney-client privilege will lie after the transaction. If the transaction is a
sale of assets, the parties to the transaction may not be certain, should a
dispute arise, whether the court will recognize the sale of assets as a change
of control of the seller such that control of the privilege travels to the
purchaser of the assets. If the situation is clearly a transformational
transaction, the parties may not want the survivor or asset purchaser to
control the privilege for any pre-transaction communications or, more
specifically, may not want the survivor or asset purchaser to control the
privilege for pre-transaction, transaction-related communications.

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Id. at 159–60.
Id. at 161.
See generally John C. Coates IV, supra note 17; Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 17.
674 N.E.2d 663 (N.Y. 1996).
Id. at 666.
Id. at 672.
Id.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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In such an environment the parties to a transaction may heed the
encouragement of the Delaware court in Great Hill and the Tekni-Plex
court’s attention to the parties’ agreement and allocation of control of the
attorney-client privilege by contract. Indeed, parties to transformational
transactions have, in recent years, begun to include a variety of provisions in
the deal documents that address the issue of privilege control.27
While the attorney-client privilege for an entity shifts as control of the
entity shifts, this limited alienability is the result of policy decisions by courts
and legislatures that have balanced various public interests. These courts
and legislatures have determined that the best balance is that an entity that
experiences a transformational transaction does not lose privilege protection
for pre-transaction communications but rather that control of the privilege
passes with control of the entity. The new controller of the entity should
decide whether to assert the privilege or not in light of what would be in the
best interest of the entity. Some courts or legislatures may decide that control
of the privilege for transaction-related communications between the target or
asset seller and counsel does not pass to the survivor or asset purchaser as a
result of the transformational transaction. Whatever the rule, the privilege
travels as a result of policy decisions made by entities charged with
consideration of public interests.
Contrary to the suggestion of the Great Hill court and others, this
Article argues, as some courts have held,28 that parties motivated by their
own self-interest but with no consideration of the public interest, should not
be allowed to allocate control of the privilege by contract. The parameters
of the privilege should not be dictated by private parties. Not only is
nonalienability by contract dictated by the values and policies the privilege
represents, but also its own structure demands this result. The notion of
waiver, a vital part of the bounds of the privilege, is at odds with any notion
of shifting control of the attorney-client privilege by contract. Recognizing
that control of the privilege can be transferred by contract also creates a
practical nightmare as parties follow the logical slippery slope to parsing
control of the privilege in pieces and parts, perhaps to travel with the sale of
this or that asset or even unattached to assets or control.29

27

See discussion infra Part V.
See, e.g., Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. WH-TV Broad. Corp., No. 01-c-4366, 2003 WL
21911066 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2003) (concluding the privilege cannot be transferred by
contract). See also Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. NWI-I, Inc., 240 F.R.D. 401 (N.D.
Ill. 2007) (court did not follow the agreement).
29
See discussion infra Part VI.A.
28
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Similarly, courts have recognized the impropriety of allowing parties
to define the parameters of the attorney-client privilege doctrine in the area
of common interest claims.30 Parties enter into agreements stating that they
share a common interest and thus claim they may share communications
without waiving privilege, but courts independently evaluate whether the
parties in fact share a legally sufficient common interest before finding no
waiver. The contracts of the parties are relevant but do not dictate to the
courts the bounds of privilege protection.
Finally, there is precedent outside the realm of privilege law of
doctrines of the justice system that private parties cannot redefine by
agreements because these creations represent interests and policy beyond
parties to any one agreement. For example, courts routinely recognize that
parties to a contract cannot enlarge a statute of limitations before a cause of
action accrues because there is a public interest in not requiring defendants
to face stale or possibly fraudulent claims and stale evidence and in “giving
repose to human affairs.”31 Just as the statute of limitations is a doctrine with
interests at play beyond those of parties to a contract, likewise, the attorneyclient privilege is a doctrine with interests at play beyond those of parties to
any one particular contract.
Parties should not be able to allocate control of the attorney-client
privilege by contract apart from control of an entity. Control of the privilege
should not be alienable by contract. Any contractual attempt to do so should
be unenforceable as against public policy.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege protects communications between an
attorney and a client, made in confidence, and made for the purpose of
obtaining or rendering legal advice or assistance,32 but only if such
communications were not made in furtherance of a crime or fraud33 and the
30

See discussion infra Part VI.B.
Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 248 N.E.2d 871, 872 (N.Y. 1969). See
discussion infra Part VI.C.
32
“Five elements are common to all definitions of the attorney-client privilege: (1) an
attorney, (2) a client, (3) a communication, (4) confidentiality anticipated and preserved, and
(5) legal advice or assistance being the purpose of the communication.” In re Vioxx Prod.
Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 795 (E.D. La. 2007). See also Wellin v. Wellin, 211 F.
Supp. 3d 793, 807 (D.S.C. 2016) (defining the attorney-client privilege under South Carolina
law).
33
See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 810 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Under the
crime-fraud exception, communications are not privileged when the client ‘consults an
attorney for advice that will serve him in the commission of a fraud’ or crime.”) (quoting
Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933)); United States v. Gorski, 807 F.3d 451, 460
(1st Cir. 2015) (“The crime-fraud exception ‘withdraws protection where the client sought or
employed legal representation in order to commit or facilitate a crime or fraud.’”) (quoting In
31
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privilege is not waived after the consultation.34 A long-revered, oft-cited
definition of the privilege is as follows:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege
is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the
communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or
his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is
acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of
which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the
presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily
either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance
in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of
committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a)
claimed and (b) not waived by the client.35
If the privilege applies, disclosure of the communication cannot be
compelled regardless of any argument of need. The protection is absolute.36
The modern rationale for the privilege, often called the utilitarian
rationale,37 is that the privilege exists to encourage clients to be forthright
with their attorneys. If a client is completely truthful and forthcoming with
counsel, that attorney can provide the client with the best possible advice.
The client can then act preventatively to stay within the bounds of the law or
can deal appropriately with the justice system for conduct that has already
occurred. Society benefits in either scenario.38 The Supreme Court in
Upjohn Corporation v. United States,39 stated that the purpose of the
privilege:
re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2005)).
34
See Schaeffler v. United States, 806 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2015) (disclosure is waiver);
In re Icenhower, 755 F.3d 1130, 1141 (9th Cir. 2014) (same).
35
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358–59 (D. Mass. 1950).
See also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, No. 3:16-mc-00079, 2016 WL 4385874, at *2 (W.D.N.C.
Aug. 16, 2016) (quoting the United Shoe test); S.E.C. v. Yorkville Advisors, LLC, 300 F.R.D.
152, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (same). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 68–86 (Am. Law Inst. 2000). Some jurisdictions, such as New
York, have codified the privilege. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4503(a).
36
See Hawkins v. Stables, 148 F.3d 379, 383 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[W]hen the privilege
applies, it affords confidential communications between lawyer and client complete
protection from disclosure”). See also Kerner v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 504, 524
(Ct. App. 2012) (“The privilege is absolute and prevents disclosure of the communication
regardless of its relevance, necessity or other circumstances peculiar to the case.”); Batra v.
Wolf, 922 N.Y.S.2d 735, 738 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (“Privileged attorney-client communications
are absolutely immune from disclosure.”).
37
See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE §5:13
(2017 update).
38
See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S 464, 470 (1888) (stating the privilege “is founded
upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of the person having
knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and
readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure”).
39
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
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is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in
the observance of law and the administration of justice. The
privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves
public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the
lawyer’s being fully informed by the client.40
A second rationale, sometimes called a “non-utilitarian” or
“humanistic” rationale, has been put forward by commentators. 41 It is a
rationale based on individual rights.42 While the courts have not adopted this
reasoning expressly, this rationale may have some implicit sway.43 This
individual rights rationale posits that the privilege protects the privacy and
dignity of the client.44 In balancing the societal good of a system of justice
that reliably reveals truth on one side with the right of the individual to be
left alone in the attorney-client relationship, this rationale leans in favor of
the right of the individual.45
40

Id. See also Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998) (quoting
Upjohn); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985)
(“[T]he attorney-client privilege serves the function of promoting full and frank
communications between attorneys and their clients. It thereby encourages observance of the
law and aids in the administration of justice.”); In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1126
(9th Cir. 2012) (“Though this in some way impedes the truth-finding process, we have long
recognized that ‘the advocate and counselor [needs] to know all that relates to the client’s
reasons for seeking representation’ if he is to provide effective legal advice.”) (quoting
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (alteration in original)); Cavallaro v. United
States, 284 F.3d 236, 245 (1st Cir. 2002) (“The rationale for the privilege is that safeguarding
communications between attorney and client encourages disclosures by the client to the
lawyer that facilitate the client’s compliance with the law and better enable the client to
present legitimate arguments should litigation arise.”). For a very early statement, see
Annesley v. Anglesea, 17 How. St. Trials 1139 (1743) (“No man can conduct any of his affairs
which relate to matters of law, without employing and consulting with an attorney; even if he
is capable of doing it in point of skill, the law will not let him; and if he does not fully and
candidly disclose every thing that is in his mind, which he apprehends may be in the least
relative to the affair he consults his attorney upon, it will be impossible for the attorney
properly to serve him . . . .”).
41
See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, § 5:13. See also KENNETH W. GRAHAM,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5472 (2017) (“Unlike the [utilitarian] argument, [the
nonutilitarian argument] does not depend on any assumption or proof of the consequences
likely to follow such disclosures.”).
42
See Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450,
1502–04 (1985) (discussing the competing rationales).
43
See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Alienability of Evidentiary Privileges: Of Property
and Evidence, Burden and Benefit, Hearsay and Privilege, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 497, 507
(2006) (stating the law grants the privilege “out of respect for the client as an autonomous
person with cognitive and volitional ability”).
44
See Deborah Stavile Bartel, Drawing Negative Inferences Upon a Claim of the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1355, 1363 (1995) (stating the privilege is “as
a protection of the right of privacy and as a promotion of the right of individual independence
and autonomy within the confining framework of a given system of laws”).
45
See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, § 5:13 (generally discussing the
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The privilege prevents some evidence that might assist the courts in
reaching the truth from being before the court.46 In recognition of this
impediment to the truth-finding goal of the justice system, courts view the
privilege warily and tend to apply it narrowly.47 Yet, “[t]he social good
derived from the proper performance of the functions of lawyers acting for
their clients is believed to outweigh the harm that may come from the
suppression of the evidence in specific cases.”48 In particular cases the truthfinding aspect of the justice system may be thwarted, but the recognition of
the privilege optimizes the ultimate goal of a just and law-abiding society.49
The privilege is thus a balance of interests set by courts and legislatures—a
determination of what would be in the best interest of society as a whole
rather than individual actors in the justice system.
The confidentiality requirement of privilege doctrine is a limit on the
scope of the privilege.50 While the privilege protects communications
between the attorney and the client to encourage the client to confide in the
lawyer, the confidentiality requirement assures that the privilege does not
apply to communications that would likely have occurred absent protection.
The assumption is that if the client does not care about the confidentiality of
rationale and noting the court’s espousal of the utilitarian rationale). See also Edward J.
Imwinkelried, The Historical Cycle in the Law of Evidentiary Privileges: Will
Instrumentalism Come into Conflict with the Modern Humanistic Theories?, 55 ARK. L. REV.
241 (2002) (same).
46
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (noting that the privilege stands
“in derogation of the search for truth”). Courts tolerate the privilege only to the extent
necessary “to encourage ‘full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients
and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration
of justice.’” Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403, (1998) (quoting Upjohn,
449 U.S. at 389). See also Western Trails, Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 4, 8
(D.D.C. 1991) (“The privilege is an exception . . . to the fundamental principle that discovery
should be liberal and broad in furtherance of the search for truth.”).
47
See, e.g., In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2012) (alteration in
original) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)) (“[B]ecause . . . this rule
‘contravene[s] the fundamental principle that the public has a right to every man’s
evidence,’ . . . we construe it narrowly to serve its purposes”); FTC v. Boehringer Ingelheim
Pharm., Inc., 180 F. Supp. 3d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263,
1272 (D.C. Cir. 1998)) (“This Court and the D.C. Circuit have consistently emphasized that
‘the attorney-client privilege must be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits
consistent with the logic of its principle.’”).
48
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950)
(quoting MODEL CODE OF EVID. R. 210 & cmt. (1942)).
49
See Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications, supra note 42 (noting the
utilitarian rationale focuses “not on the benefits produced during particular lawsuits, but on
the aggregate benefits that accrue from having the privilege in all court cases”).
50
See Melanie B. Leslie, The Costs of Confidentiality and the Purpose of Privilege, 2000
WIS. L. REV. 31, 47 (2000); Paul R. Rice, Attorney–Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of
Confidentiality Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L. J. 853, 856 (1998); Paul R. Rice, A Bad Idea
Dying Hard: A Reply to Professor Leslie’s Defense of the Indefensible, 2001 WIS. L. REV.
187, 187–88 (2001).
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the communication, the client would have that communication with the
attorney even without privilege protection—the privilege protection is
unnecessary. If a client has other people present, actually or virtually, when
the communication occurs, the client has indicated that secrecy privacy is
not important. The privilege does not protect that communication as a
result.51
Likewise, the client must keep the communication confidential after it
occurs. Sharing the communication with others indicates to the world that
privacy is not important with regard to the substance of the client-lawyer
communication. Thus, the protection of the privilege is no longer necessary.
So disclosure to third parties waives the privilege that otherwise protects the
communication.52
Even with this emphasis on confidentiality, the protection of the
privilege does not evaporate with every disclosure of an otherwise protected
communication. The law recognizes situations in which the communication
is disclosed but the privilege still applies. For example, courts often do not
find a waiver of the attorney-client privilege if a communication has been
inadvertently disclosed.53 Similarly, the privilege is not waived when the
51
See In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 361 (3d Cir. 2007) (“A
communication is only privileged if it is made in confidence. In other words, if persons other
than the client, its attorney, or their agents are present, the communication is not made in
confidence, and the privilege does not attach.”); In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc., 450 F.3d
1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating the privilege will only be recognized when “the
communication between the client and the attorney is made in confidence of the relationship
and under circumstances from which it may reasonably be assumed that the communication
will remain in confidence”); In re Condemnation City of Phila., 981 A.2d 391, 397 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2009) (“Confidentiality is key to the privilege, and the presence of a third-party
during attorney-client communications will generally negate the privilege; presumably, the
client does not intend communications to be confidential if they are heard by someone else.”).
See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 68 (stating presence of a third party prevents
confidentiality).
52
See In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation
omitted) (quoting Stuffing the Rabbit Back into the Hat: Limited Waiver of the Attorney–
Client Privilege in an Administrative Agency Investigation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1198, 1207
(1982)) (“Most pertinent here is that voluntarily disclosing privileged documents to third
parties will generally destroy the privilege. The reason behind this rule is that, ‘[i]f clients
themselves divulge such information to third parties, chances are that they would also have
divulged it to their attorneys, even without the protection of the privilege.’”); In re Teleglobe
Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 361 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted) (“The disclosure rule
operates as a corollary to this principle: if a client subsequently shares a privileged
communication with a third party, then it is no longer confidential, and the privilege ceases to
protect it. This is because the act of disclosing signals that the client does not intend to keep
the communication secret.”); Lynx Servs. Ltd. v. Horstman, No. 3:14-cv-01967, 2016 WL
4565895, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2016) (“If a client voluntarily discloses privileged
communications to a third party, the client waives the privilege as to communications on the
same subject matter.”). See generally PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE
UNITED STATES § 9:28 (2016) (discussing waiver by disclosure).
53
See, e.g., McDermott Will & Emery LLP v. Superior Court, 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 47 (Ct.
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disclosure of otherwise privileged communications results from illegal
acts.54 Also, some courts have recognized a common interest doctrine which
allows parties with a common interest to share privileged communications
without waiving the privilege.55

App. 2017) (no waiver from inadvertently disclosed email); Estate of Savage v. Kredentser,
55 N.Y.S.3d 484 (App. Div. 2017) (no waiver from inadvertent disclosure of report).
Federal Rule of Evidence 502 states in part:
The following provisions apply, in the circumstances set out, to
disclosure of a communication or information covered by the attorneyclient privilege or work-product protection. . . . (b) Inadvertent
Disclosure. When made in a federal proceeding or to a federal office
or agency, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a federal or
state proceeding if: (1) the disclosure is inadvertent; (2) the holder of
the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure;
and (3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error,
including (if applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(5)(B).
FED. R. EVID. 502(b). See also Bhd. of Teamsters, Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund
v. Palladium Equity Partners, LLC, 722 F. Supp. 2d 845, 849–51 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (applying
Federal Rule of Evidence 502; “the defendants took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure
during the . . . document production” requiring review of “63,025 documents totaling an
estimated 4.7 million pages” and that “the defendants took prompt steps to recall the
documents once they realized that they had been disclosed”).
54
See, e.g., Sackman v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 173 F.R.D. 358, 365 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (expert
testimony based on a stolen document was excluded); Parnes v. Parnes, 915 N.Y.S.2d 345,
349 (App. Div. 2011) (no waiver; wife accessed husband’s e-mail without authorization).
55
See, e.g., Schaeffler v. United States, 806 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2015) (no waiver because
the consortium of banks and the taxpayer shared a common interest); Crane Sec. Techs., Inc.
v. Rolling Optics, AB, 230 F. Supp. 3d 10 (D. Mass. 2017) (no waiver regarding
communications between patentee’s inventor and patent counsel, inventor and patent counsel
for the future licensee of the patent and between two counsel because of common interest).
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers section 76 states:
(1) If two or more clients with a common interest in a litigated or
nonlitigated matter are represented by separate lawyers and they agree
to exchange information concerning the matter, a communication of
any such client that otherwise qualifies as privileged under §§ 68–72
that relates to the matter is privileged as against third persons. Any
such client may invoke the privilege, unless it has been waived by the
client who made the communication.
(2) Unless the clients have agreed otherwise, a communication
described in Subsection (1) is not privileged as between clients
described in Subsection (1) in a subsequent adverse proceeding
between them.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 (Am. Law Inst. 2000). See
generally Grace M. Giesel, End the Experiment: The Attorney-Client Privilege Should Not
Protect Communications in the Allied Lawyer Settingˆ 95 MARQ. L. REV. 475 (2012)
(discussing the history and use of the common interest doctrine); Katharine Taylor Schaffzin,
An Uncertain Privilege: Why the Common Interest Doctrine Does Not Work and How
Uniformity Can Fix It, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 49 (2005) (same).
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III. CONTROL OF THE PRIVILEGE
A. The Client’s Privilege
In modern times, the privilege is the client’s right: the client may assert
it or waive it.56 Long ago, the privilege was viewed as the attorney’s right.57
A court could not require an attorney to testify against the client with regard
to the client’s secrets,58 even if those secrets were not the product of
confidential communications.59 Gradually, courts turned to the modern
rationale to justify the privilege and concomitantly adopted the view that the
client controlled the privilege.60 This modern approach is now universally
accepted.61
In the vast majority of situations, the person or entity with the right to
control the privilege is obvious. The individual client controls the privilege
for him or herself.62 Individuals who manage an entity control the privilege
for the entity,63 regardless of the identity of the employee with whom counsel
56
See United States v. Yielding, 657 F.3d 688, 707 (8th Cir. 2011) (“The privilege
belongs to and exists solely for the benefit of the client.”); Sandra T.E. v. S. Berwyn Sch.
Dist. 100, 600 F.3d 612, 618 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The [attorney-client] privilege belongs to the
client, although an attorney may assert the privilege on the client’s behalf.”); In re New
England Compounding Pharm., Inc. MDL No. 13-2419, 2016 WL 6883215, at *2 (D. Mass.
July 28, 2016) (stating the privilege belongs to the client). See also RICE, supra note 52, at §
9.1 (stating the privilege belongs to the client).
57
See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at § 5:13 n.5.
58
See RICE, supra note 52, § 1:2. See also Giesel, supra note 55, at 494.
59
See Leslie, supra note 50, at 48 (“Given this justification for the privilege,
confidentiality was entirely irrelevant—the aim was to shelter the attorney from being forced
to testify against his client and violate his trust.”). See also Max Radin, The Privilege of
Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487 (1928).
60
For a time, courts were of two minds. See, e.g., Baker v. Arnold, 1 Cai. R. 258, 266
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803) (stating the privilege is the client’s); Preston v. Carr, 148 Eng. Rep. 634,
635 (1826) (“I cannot accede to the proposition . . . that the privilege of an attorney is the
privilege of the client . . . .”).
61
See RICE, supra note 52, § 1:3 (“By the time the privilege arose in American case law,
it was fully established as belonging to the client.”).
62
For natural persons, the privilege survives death. See Swidler & Berlin v. United
States, 524 U.S. 399, 405 (1998). See generally Simon J. Frankel, The Attorney-Client
Privilege After the Death of the Client, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 45 (1992). State privilege
law often provides that the personal representative of the client controls the privilege after
death; the privilege terminates when the estate of the deceased is concluded. See, e.g., CAL.
EVID. CODE § 953(c) (the personal representative of the client controls the privilege); KY. R.
EVID. § 503(c) (“The privilege may be claimed by the client, the client’s guardian or
conservator, the personal representative of a deceased client, or the successor, trustee, or
similar representative of a corporation, association, or other organization, whether or not in
existence.”).
63
See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985)
(“[F]or solvent corporations, the power to waive the corporate attorney-client privilege rests
with the corporation’s management and is normally exercised by its officers and directors.”).
See also Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev. LLC v. Cieslak, 2015 WL 4773585, at *8 (D. Nev.
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communicated to create the privileged communication. The privilege in
such a scenario belongs to the entity, not the individual agent of the entity,
communicating with counsel and not the individual member of management
deciding whether to assert or waive the privilege on behalf of the entity.64 In
the context of transformational transactions involving entities, however, the
repose of the right to control the privilege after such a transaction may not
be so obvious.
B. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub: Control of
the Privilege Travels with Control of the Entity
In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub,65 the United
States Supreme Court addressed the issue of control of the privilege in the
context of an entity’s bankruptcy. The entity, a commodity broker, had
pursued liquidation in a chapter seven bankruptcy.66 The Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, as part of a fraud and misappropriation
investigation of the entity, subpoenaed documents held by the entity’s former
attorney and sought to depose the attorney.67 The attorney refused to answer
certain questions, claiming the entity’s attorney-client privilege.68 The
receiver, as the interim bankruptcy trustee, waived the privilege on behalf of
the entity.69 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a trustee
in bankruptcy did not have control of the entity’s privilege.70 The Second
and Eighth Circuits had reached the opposite result.71

Aug. 13, 2015) (“The power to waive the attorney-client privilege rests with the corporation’s
or entity’s governing officers or directors . . . .”).
64
Occasionally, the entity agrees to disclose communications between the entity’s
attorney and an employee. If the interests of the entity and the interests of the employee have
diverged, the employee may claim that the attorney represented him or her individually as
well as representing the entity. Thus, the employee may claim that he or she controls the
privilege regarding the communications between the employee and the attorney. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2009); Commonwealth. v. Schultz, 133 A.3d
294 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016). See generally Grace M. Giesel, Upjohn Warnings, the AttorneyClient Privilege, and Principles of Lawyer Ethics: Achieving Harmony, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV.
109 (2010).
65
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985).
66
Id. at 345–46.
67
Id. at 346.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 722 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1984).
71
See In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 670 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1982); Citibank, N.A. v.
Andros, 666 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1981).
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Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, concluded that the trustee in
bankruptcy does indeed control the privilege for the debtor entity.72 The
opinion analogized the situation to a change of control situation for an entity.
The opinion noted that the power to waive and thus control the privilege for
an entity rested with the entity’s management—the officers and directors,
who, of course, derive authority from the shareholders and must act in the
best interests of the entity.73 The opinion continued that when control of the
corporation shifts to new management, control of the privilege shifts as well.
In particular, the Court stated:
The parties also agree that when control of a corporation passes to
new management, the authority to assert and waive the
corporation’s attorney-client privilege passes as well. New
managers installed as a result of a takeover, merger, loss of
confidence by shareholders, or simply normal succession, may
waive the attorney-client privilege with respect to
communications made by former officers and directors. Displaced
managers may not assert the privilege over the wishes of current
managers, even as to statements that the former might have made
to counsel concerning matters within the scope of their corporate
duties.74
The Court determined that the trustee was the actor in bankruptcy with
the role most like the role of management in a solvent corporation. 75 Thus,
control of the privilege for the debtor entity rested with the trustee.76 In
response to the argument that corporate actors might be wary of consulting
the entity’s counsel if they think that a trustee might waive the privilege for
the entity if a bankruptcy occurs, the opinion simply notes that the danger
would be no greater than in the situation of successor management outside
of the bankruptcy setting.77 The Court did not delve into a discussion of that
danger, however, but rather accepted such an effect.

72
Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 358 (“[T]he trustee of a corporation in bankruptcy has the
power to waive the corporation’s attorney-client privilege with respect to prebankruptcy
communications.”).
73
Id. at 348. See also DAVID M. GREENWALD, ROBERT R. STAUFFER & ERIN R.
SCHRANTZ, 1 TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 1:63 (3d ed. 2015) (stating control of an entity’s
privilege rests with the “controlling management” of the entity).
74
Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 349.
75
Id. at 353 (“[T]he trustee plays the role most closely analogous to that of a solvent
corporation’s management.”).
76
Id. at 358 (“[T]he trustee of a corporation in bankruptcy has the power to waive the
corporation’s attorney-client privilege with respect to prebankruptcy communications.”). See
generally RICE, supra note 52, §4:42 (trustee in bankruptcy controls the privilege).
77
Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 357.
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Thus, Weintraub established that control of the attorney-client privilege
for the entity’s earlier communications passes with control of the entity in
bankruptcy and also in transformational transactions.
C. What Constitutes Transfer of Control of an Entity? What is a
Transformational Transaction?
The Weintraub opinion states the federal rule,78 and states follow the
federal principle as well.79 Courts have looked to it as the definitive word
on control of the privilege in the setting of transformational entity changes;80
control of the privilege for pre-transaction communications passes with
control of the entity. In the intervening years, courts have explored how that
concept applies in a variety of transactions.
While there is no doubt that a merger results in a change of control of
the entity and the control of the attorney-client privilege shifts as well,81
courts have explored whether control of the privilege shifts in other sorts of
transactions such as sales of assets.82 Courts have held that when the
78

See Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 689 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (relying on Weintraub and finding that control of the privilege passed with control of a
subsidiary entity). See also In re Optuminsight, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-03424, 2017 WL 3096300
(Fed. Cir. July 20, 2017) (applying the rule as federal law); United States v. Askins, No. 3:13cr-00162, 2016 WL 4039204 (M.D. Tenn. July 28, 2016) (same).
79
See, e.g., KY. R. EVID. 503(c) (“The privilege may be claimed by the client, the client’s
guardian or conservator, the personal representative of a deceased client, or the successor,
trustee, or similar representative of a corporation, association, or other organization, whether
or not in existence.”). See also CAL. EVID. CODE § 953(d) (a holder of the privilege is “[a]
successor, assign, trustee in dissolution, or any similar representative of a firm, association,
organization, partnership, business trust, corporation, or public entity that is no longer in
existence”); In re Cap Rock Elec. Coop., Inc., 35 S.W.3d 222, 228 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000)
(applying Texas law: privileges follow the change of control in a merger).
80
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 734 F. Supp. 1207, 1211 (E.D. Va. 1990), aff’d
in part, 902 F.2d 244 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 349) (“[T]he principle
that emerges from Weintraub and the subsequent decisions is that ‘when control of a
corporation passes to new management, the authority to assert and waive the corporation’s
attorney-client privilege passes as well.’”); Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. NWI-I, Inc.,
240 F.R.D. 401, 406 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (“we see no reason to deviate from the well-established
principle that the right to assert or waive a corporation’s attorney-client privilege is an incident
of control of the corporation”); NCL Corp. v. Lone Star Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., 144 B.R. 170, 174
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1992) (control of the attorney-client privilege is an incident of control of the
corporation).
81
See, e.g., Girl Scouts-W. Okla. v. Barringer-Thomson, 252 P.3d 844–49 (Okla. 2011)
(stating successor in merger transaction controlled the privilege with regard to the regular
business; the court noted that the privilege with regard to communications surrounding the
merger were not at issue).
82
See, e.g., Gary Friedrich Enters., LLC v. Marvel Enters., Inc., No. 08-cv-1533, 2011
WL 2020586, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2011) (the privilege passes through various
reiterations of the business); M-I LLC v. Stelly, No. 4:09-cv-1552, 2010 WL 2196281, at *4
(S.D. Tex. May 26, 2010) (the privilege passes through several transactions including an asset
purchase); Coffin v. Bowater Inc., No. 03-cv-227, 2005 WL 5885367, at *2 (D. Me. May 13,
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substance, the “practical consequences”83 of the transaction, is
transformational, even if the transaction is a sale of assets, control of the
privilege passes along with control of the entity.84 If the transaction results
in the transfer of a business, even if the business is only a part of an entity,
courts sometimes find that control of the business has shifted and so control
of the privilege has shifted as well.85
For example, in Soverain Software LLC v. Gap, Inc.,86 the court noted
that there are “myriad ways control of a corporation or a portion of a
corporation can change hands.”87 The court stated that sale of some of a
corporation’s assets or a patent does not trigger transfer of the right to control
the attorney-client privilege, but “if the practical consequences of the
transaction result in the transfer of control of the business and the
continuation of the business under new management, the authority to assert
or waive the attorney-client privilege will follow as well.”88 In Soverain,
two corporations operated a business which was the “commercial
embodiment” of three patents that were the subject of the dispute.89 After
the two corporations filed for bankruptcy, an intermediary purchased the
assets of the companies including the particular business related to the
patents.90 The intermediary eventually sold the business to another entity
which continued to operate it.91 The court declined to find that this scenario
2005) (sale of assets was transfer of control).
83
This often-used phrase was coined in Tekni-Plex, Inc. v. Meyner & Landis, 674
N.E.2d 663, 668 (N.Y. 1996). The court stated: “When ownership of a corporation changes
hands, whether the attorney-client relationship transfers as well to the new owners turns on
the practical consequences rather than the formalities of the particular transaction.” Id.
84
See, e.g., MacKenzie-Childs LLC v. MacKenzie-Childs, 262 F.R.D. 241, 252–53
(W.D.N.Y. 2009) (the privilege passed with the transfer of “substantially all of the assets”;
the purchaser continued the business of the seller of the assets); Postorivo v. AG Paintball
Holdings, Inc., Nos. 2991-VCP, 3111-VCP, 2008 WL 343856, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 2008)
(sale of “substantially all of the assets”); Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. NWI-I, Inc.,
240 F.R.D. 401, 408 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (sale of “substantially all” of the assets). But see Applied
Asphalt Techs. v. Sam B. Corp., No. 2:14-cv-00800, 2016 WL 427070, at *5 (D. Utah Feb.
3, 2016) (transfer of patent did not cause a transfer of control of the privilege).
85
See, e.g., USI Ins. Servs., LLC v. Ryan & WDCK, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-151, 2014 WL
3054278 (N.D. Ind. July 7, 2014) (the insurance business transferred from Wells Fargo though
Wells Fargo continued to conduct other businesses).
86
340 F. Supp. 2d 760 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
87
Id. at 763.
88
Id. The Soverain court was following Tekni-Plex with this “practical consequences”
test. Other courts have applied the “practical consequences” test as well. See, e.g., USI Ins.
Servs., LLC v. Ryan, No. 1:14-cv-151, 2014 WL 3054278, at *4 (N.D. Ind. July 7, 2014)
(quoting this statement from Soverain); John Crane Prod. Sols., Inc. v. R2R & D, LLC, No.
3:11-cv-3237, 2012 WL 3453696, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2012) (quoting this statement
from Soverain).
89
Soverain, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 762.
90
Id. at 763.
91
Id.
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was a “mere transfer of assets.”92 Rather, the court viewed the last entity
operating the business to be the successor management of the business and
so was the successor to the control of the privilege for that business.93
In John Crane Production Solutions, Inc. v. R2R and D, LLC,94 the
court explained the “practical consequences” analysis as follows:
In determining whether the “practical consequences” of a given
transaction result in the “transfer of control,” courts consider such
factors as the extent of the assets acquired, including whether
stock was sold, whether the purchasing entity continues to sell the
same product or service, whether the old customers and
employees are retained, and whether the same patents and
trademarks are used.95
The John Crane court concluded that although the situation before it
involved an asset purchase agreement, the “practical consequences” were
that the asset purchaser continued to run the original business, simply with
new management.96 The transaction involved most of the assets of the
business. Thus, the privilege passed with the assets transferred.97
Several courts have focused on the business unit, not simply the entire
entity, when deciding whether control of the privilege passed. For example,
in USI Insurance Services, LLC v. Ryan,98 USI acquired its insurance
business from Wells Fargo in an asset purchase transaction that included all
of the “assets, information, and goodwill” of the insurance business though
what was acquired was certainly not all of the assets of Wells Fargo.99 After
the transaction, USI conducted the same type of insurance business in the
same locations as Wells Fargo did before the transaction.100 The court held
that control of the insurance business passed in the transaction to the
purchaser and thus that control of the attorney-client privilege passed as
well.101
92

Id.
Id. See also UTStarcom, Inc. v. Starent Networks, Corp., No. 07-civ-2582, 2009 WL
4908579 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2009) (privilege transferred with transfer of business unit); Parus
Holdings, Inc. v. Banner & Witcoff, Ltd., 585 F. Supp. 2d 995 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (privilege
transferred; transfer of patent was transfer of business).
94
John Crane Prod. Sols., Inc. v. R2R & D, LLC, No. 3:11-cv-3237, 2012 WL 3453696,
at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2012).
95
Id.
96
Id. at *4.
97
Id. The privilege issue arose as part of a motion to disqualify counsel. Id. at *1.
98
No. 1:14-cv-151, 2014 WL 3054278 (N.D. Ind. July 7, 2014).
99
Id. at *1.
100
Id. at *5. The court stated: “[t]he same type of insurance business is conducted from
the same geographic location, serving[] the same clients, and employing most of the same
employees. In short, the practical consequences of the transaction is that the Fort Wayne
Business has simply continued under new management.” Id.
101
Id. (“For these reasons, the Court concludes that USI is Wells Fargo’s successor to the
93
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Likewise, in UTStarcom, Inc. v. Starent Networks, Corp.,102 a court,
applying the “practical consequences” test,103 determined that the purchaser
of assets of a business unit gained control of the attorney-client privilege
with regard to the unit as well.104 The court stated: “[w]here the new owner
not only acquires certain assets, but also continues to operate the business
enterprise, the practical consequence of the transaction is that control of the
enterprise has passed to the new owner along with the attorney-client
privilege incident to it.”105 The purchaser had not purchased all of the assets
of the business unit much less all of the assets of the entity,106 yet the court
determined that the buyer used the purchase of “substantially all” of the
assets of a business unit and continued to operate a distinct business unit.107
The purchaser of the assets thus controlled the attorney-client privilege for
that business unit.108
In contrast, in Applied Asphalt Technologies v. Sam B. Corp.,109 the
court rejected a claim that the entirety of a business, and therefore control of
a business, transferred with the transfer of a patent.110 The court noted that
the transferring entity continued to exist and was not controlled by the entity
to whom the patent was transferred. Thus, the court concluded that control
of the attorney-client privilege likewise did not transfer.111

Fort Wayne Business for purposes of the attorney-client privilege.”). The privilege issue
arose as part of USI’s motion to disqualify counsel for the opposition. Id. at *1. See also
SimpleAir, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:11-cv-416, 2013 WL 4574594, at *3 (E.D. Tex.
Aug. 27, 2013) (purchaser of almost all of the assets passing through bankruptcy proceeding,
including the patents important to the business, controlled the privilege).
102
No. 07-c-2582, 2009 WL 4908579 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2009).
103
Id. at *3.
104
Id. at *5.
105
Id. at *3.
106
Id. at *4.
107
Id. at *5.
108
UTStarcom, Inc. v. Starent Networks, Corp., No. 07-2582, 2009 WL 4908579, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2009). See also Parus Holdings, Inc. v. Banner & Witcoff, Ltd., 585 F.
Supp. 2d 995, 1002–03 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (purchaser of patents continued the operation of the
division of the business related to those patents and thus controlled the attorney-client
privilege regarding that division).
109
No. 2:14-cv-00800, 2016 WL 427070 (D. Utah Feb. 3, 2016).
110
Id. at *5.
111
Id. See also Lynx Servs. Ltd. v. Horstman, No. 3:14-cv-01967, 2016 WL 4565895
(N.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2016) (involving an asset sale of “substantially all” of the sellers’ assets
but not a transfer of control; the privilege did not travel with the assets); R.G. Egan Equip.,
Inc. v. Polymag Tek, Inc., 758 N.Y.S.2d 763 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) (specific assets, a patent
and the entity name, transferred but not control of the entity or privilege); Yosemite Inv., Inc.
v. Floyd Bell, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 882 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (purchase of the rights to a patent does
not transfer control of the attorney-client privilege).
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As these cases illustrate, courts make fact-specific determinations as to
whether the transaction that has occurred has been transformational—
whether control of the entity has passed to another. If a court determines that
the result of a transaction or group of transactions is that control of the entity
has passed, then the court must conclude that the right to assert or waive the
attorney-client privilege for the current and prior entity has passed to the
successor as a matter of law. Control of the privilege transfers, but only by
operation of law as an incident of control of the entity. Because the analysis
is fact-specific, at the time of some transactions, the parties may not be clear
whether control of the entity and thus control of the privilege passes in a
transaction.
IV. CONTROL OF THE PRIVILEGE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL TRANSACTIONS
A. The Setting
The logic of the basic Weintraub rule places it above reproach with
regard to pre-transaction communications not related to the transformational
transaction itself. When the question is control of the privilege for
transaction-related, pre-transaction communications, the logic of the rule
still wins out, but it is a closer question. The controllers of the surviving or
purchasing entity, those corporate actors who are charged with fiduciary
responsibility to act in the best interest of the entity, should be the ones
deciding whether to waive or assert the privilege on behalf of the entity.112
But the situation presents some uncomfortable results. After a merger of
corporation Alpha and Beta with Alpha as the surviving entity, Alpha
controls the privilege as to all privileged communications between Beta and
its counsel that occurred before the merger, including communications about
the transaction. Alpha has access to and use of those communications to
establish claims of wrongdoing on the part of the pre-transaction
representatives of Beta.113
This result is bothersome in that it effectively gives Alpha, the
surviving entity, access to and control over attorney-client privileged
communications involving parties who were arguably adversarial at the time
112
See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348–49 (1985)
(“The managers, of course, must exercise the privilege in a manner consistent with their
fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation and not of themselves as
individuals.”); Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev. LLC v. Cieslak, No. 2:15-cv-01189, 2015 WL
4773585 at *8 (D. Nev. Aug. 13, 2015) (“The power to waive the attorney-client privilege
rests with the corporation’s or entity’s governing officers or directors who must exercise the
privilege in a manner consistent with their fiduciary duties to the corporation or entity.”).
113
See, e.g., Newspring Mezzanine Capital II, L.P. v. Hayes, No. 14-1706, 2014 WL
6908058 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2014) (applying federal privilege law, the court found that the
parties did not allocate the privilege by agreement and that the privilege passed with control
of the entity).
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of the communications. If the representatives of Beta are aware of this
possibility at the time of the pre-transaction communications, those actors
may not access legal advice for Beta. Those representatives might fear that
the purchaser might later use those communications against them. In not
obtaining legal counsel and advice, the Beta representatives would perhaps,
violate fiduciary duties owed to the entity. In addition, the rationale of the
privilege, encouraging full consultation with counsel, would be thwarted.
The Supreme Court in Weintraub addressed this issue with regard to
the bankruptcy context, but determined that the balance was properly struck
by placing control of the privilege squarely in the hands of the surviving
entity. The court accepted the awkward result as the proper balance of the
policies and goals at issue.114 Since the Weintraub opinion, two approaches
have emerged for pre-transaction, transaction-related communications. One
approach, crafted by a New York court, may (or may not) be read to craft an
exception for transaction-related communications such that control of the
privilege for these communications does not travel with control of the
entity.115 Another approach, adopted in Delaware, makes no exception and
holds that the privilege for pre-transaction communications, even those
relating to the transaction, travels to the surviving entity or asset purchaser.116
Both approaches embrace the use of contractual privilege allocation
provisions.
B. The New York Approach: Tekni-Plex, Inc, v. Meyner & Landis
In Tekni-Plex, Inc. v. Meyner & Landis,117 the New York Court of
Appeals addressed the question of control of the privilege after a
transformational transaction for pre-transaction communications. TekniPlex, Inc. transferred all assets, rights, and liabilities to a new entity in
exchange for the purchase price.118 The agreement contained representations
114
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 357 (1985). The
Supreme Court stated:
[R]espondents argue that giving the trustee control over the attorneyclient privilege will have an undesirable chilling effect on attorneyclient communications. According to respondents, corporate managers
will be wary of speaking freely with corporate counsel if their
communications might subsequently be disclosed due to
bankruptcy. . . . But the chilling effect is no greater here than in the
case of a solvent corporation, where individual officers and directors
always run the risk that successor management might waive the
corporation’s attorney-client privilege with respect to prior
management’s communications with counsel.
Id. (citation omitted).
115
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
116
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
117
674 N.E.2d 663 (N.Y. 1996).
118
Id. at 665.
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and warranties of the sole shareholder that Tekni-Plex was in compliance
with all environmental laws and regulations and possessed all necessary
permits for the operation of the business. The agreement also provided that
the sole shareholder would indemnify for any misrepresentations or breaches
of warranties. After the transaction, the new entity changed its name to
“Tekni-Plex, Inc.” and carried on the business that Tekni-Plex had engaged
in before the merger.119
The surviving Tekni-Plex later pursued the sole shareholder of the pretransaction Tekni-Plex in arbitration for misrepresentations related to
environmental issues.120 In addition to disqualifying the firm that had
previously represented the target from representing the shareholder in the
later litigation, the court held that the surviving corporation controlled the
attorney-client privilege regarding communications between the target and
counsel before the merger if those communications did not relate to the
merger, the transformational transaction.121
With regard to transaction-related, pre-transaction communications
between counsel and the target, the court took a different approach, holding
that the surviving entity did not control the privilege with regard to those
communications. The court stated:
New Tekni-Plex, however, does not control the attorney-client
privilege with regard to discrete communications made by either
old Tekni-Plex or [the former sole shareholder] individually to
[the members of the law firm] concerning the acquisition—a time
when old Tekni-Plex and [the former sole shareholder] were
joined in an adversarial relationship to [the new entity].122
The court noted that the claims the surviving entity was pursuing “did
not derive from the rights it inherited from old Tekni-Plex but from the rights
retained by the buyer . . . with respect to the transaction.”123 The court
refused to allow the surviving entity to “pursue the rights of the buyer . . .
and simultaneously assume the attorney-client rights that the buyer’s
adversary (old Tekni-Plex) retained regarding the transaction.”124 Such
“would thwart, rather than promote, the purposes underlying the
privilege.”125
119

Id.
Id.
121
Id. at 666, 670. The court noted that “Weintraub establishes that, where efforts are
made to run the pre-existing business entity and manage its affairs, successor management
stands in the shoes of prior management and controls the attorney-client privilege with respect
to matters concerning the company’s operations.” Id. at 668.
122
Id. at 666.
123
Tekni-Plex, 674 N.E.2d at 671.
124
Id.
125
See Orbit One Commc’ns v. Numerex Corp.,255 F.R.D. 98, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). See
120
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The true reach of this decision is unclear. The Tekni-Plex opinion can
be read broadly to say that in any change of control transaction, the control
of the attorney-client privilege for the target entity passes to the surviving
entity except for the privilege relating to communications about the
transaction. In effect, an exception to the Weintraub rule is created which
applies to transformational transaction communications.
Yet, the opinion may be more limited. The Tekni-Plex court was
dealing with a target entity that had a sole shareholder who was also the
president, chief executive officer, and sole director.126 Without providing
the exact document language, the court noted that the former sole
shareholder of the target and the target had “expressly provided that [the
community between the selling shareholder and his corporation] be
preserved in any subsequent dispute regarding the acquisition.”127 Further,
the court twice conditioned its holding on the fact that the parties had agreed
that in any dispute arising from the transaction, the parties would remain
adverse to each other.128 The court provided no agreement language to
also Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. M.E.S., Inc., 289 F.R.D. 41 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). In Safeco, the
court applied New York law in a case involving indemnity agreements. One party was granted
several interim remedies including the right to an assignment of certain of the defendants’
claims against others and the right to access the defendants’ books and records. Id. at 45. That
party then claimed that it controlled the attorney-client privilege with regard to
communications relating to those assignments, books, and records. Id. The court noted that
in Tekni-Plex the court refused to find that control of the privilege for transformational
transaction communications passed to the survivor because the effect “would significantly
chill attorney-client communication during such transactions.” Id. at 53 (quoting Tekni-Plex,
89 N.Y.2d at 135–36). The Safeco court concluded that the situation before it was the same
and so denied the party control of the privilege and access to the communications, noting that
the parties could have expressly agreed otherwise. Safeco, 289 F.R.D. at 53.
126
Tekni-Plex, 674 N.E.2d at 665.
127
Id. at 671.
128
The court stated:
Where the parties to a corporate acquisition agree that in any
subsequent dispute arising out of the transaction the interest of the
buyer will be pitted against the interests of the sold corporation,
corporate actors should not have to worry that their privileged
communications with counsel concerning the negotiations might be
available to the buyer for use against the sold corporation in any
ensuing litigation. Such concern would significantly chill attorneyclient communication during the transaction.
Id. at 671–72. At another point the court stated:
Thus, while generally “parties who negotiate a corporate acquisition
should expect that the privileges of the acquired corporation would be
incidents of the sale,” the agreement between the parties here
contemplated that, in any dispute arising from the merger transaction,
the rights of the acquired corporation, old Tekni-Plex, relating to the
transaction would remain independent from and adverse to the rights
of new Tekni-Plex.
Id. at 672 (quoting Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 689 F. Supp. 841,
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support this qualification. Perhaps the qualification simply arose from the
fact that the parties included indemnity provisions in the merger documents
or from the general nature of the transaction itself. In any event, these
qualifications make it unclear whether the Tekni-Plex court intended to state
a rule for all transformational transactions or only those whose documents
contain certain provisions.129 While both interpretations would create an
exception to the Weintraub rule, the latter interpretation creates a much more
limited one. What is clear, however, is that the Tekni-Plex court was
amenable to parties allocating control of the privilege by contract.
The ambiguity of the Tekni-Plex opinion about the import of express
contract language on the issue of privilege control is illustrated by the way
other courts have interpreted the opinion. For example, one court has read
the decision to not be dependent on the contract language before the TekniPlex court, while another federal court has done just the opposite. In Orbit
One Communications, Inc. v. Numerex Corporation,130 the parties to an asset
sale were litigating various issues surrounding the transaction.131 The court
interpreted Tekni-Plex as holding that the privilege with regard to transaction
communications did not travel to the surviving entity because to hold
otherwise would “chill attorney-client communication during such
transactions.”132 The court noted that the Tekni-Plex court “found further
support” for its holding in the language of the agreement but stated that the
language “was not central to the court’s legal analysis.”133 The Orbit One
court stated that allowing the survivor to control the privilege for transaction
communications would create a “fundamentally unfair result.”134 However,
the court then posited that agreement language supported the conclusion as
it had in Tekni-Plex. 135
In contrast, in In re Hechinger Investment Company of Delaware,
Inc.,136 the court was persuaded that the agreement language in Tekni-Plex
had been dispositive. The court determined that control of the privilege for
transaction communications passed to the trustee of a liquidating trust and
did not remain with the original control group of the entity that had entered
842 (N.D. Ill. 1988)).
129
See also Henry Sill Bryans, Business Successors and the Transpositional AttorneyClient Relationship, 64 BUS. LAW. 1039, 1046 (2009) (“It is not clear exactly what the Merger
Agreement actually provided on this issue, nor is it clear how much the provision referred to
affected the result reached by the court on [the law firm’s] advice to [the shareholder] on the
transaction itself.”).
130
255 F.R.D. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
131
Id. at 101.
132
Id. at 105.
133
Id. at 105 n.6.
134
Id. at 106–07.
135
Id. at 106 n.9.
136
285 B.R. 601 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002).
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the bankruptcy process.137 After noting that Tekni-Plex did not deal with the
bankruptcy setting,138 the court distinguished the situation before it from that
in Tekni-Plex by noting that the Tekni-Plex court relied on the transaction
agreement for its holding while the matter before the Hechinger court had
no such agreement language.139 The court stated that the Tekni-Plex court’s
reasoning “strongly suggests that, absent the parties’ acknowledgement in
the merger documents, the privilege transferred would have included the premerger information.”140
While these subsequent cases highlight the lack of clarity of the TekniPlex holding, they also explicitly or implicitly accept the premise that
contracting parties have the ability to allocate control of the privilege by
contract. Similarly, the court in Postorivo v. AG Paintball Holdings, Inc.141
placed emphasis on the terms of the contract between the parties. The
Delaware court applied New York law142 to a sale of “substantially all” of
the assets of a business.143 The court followed the teachings of Tekni-Plex,
confirming that control of the privilege passed to the buyer in the
transformational transaction generally144 but not with regard to
communications relating to the transaction itself.145 The Postorivo court
noted that the communications surrounding the transaction occurred when
the parties were in an adversarial posture146 and that the transaction
document did not transfer control of the privilege regarding the transaction
to the buyers.147 The court also determined that the privilege relating to
communications relevant to a particular piece of litigation was controlled by
the sellers because the transformational transaction agreement allocated
137

Id. at 613.
Id. at 611.
139
Id. at 611–12 (“The Tekni-Plex court did not address, since the facts did not call upon
it to do so, the ownership of the attorney-client privilege regarding pre-merger information
after completion of a merger transaction in the absence of such language.”).
140
Id. at 612. The reasoning related to the Tekni-Plex court’s holding regarding
disqualification of counsel. Id.
141
Nos. 2991-VCP, 3111-VCP, 2008 WL 343856 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 2008).
142
Id. at *4. The parties selected New York law in the transactional document. The court
noted that Delaware follows the approach of Section 145 of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws (1997) with regard to choice of law and that “Delaware courts also generally
honor contractually designated choice-of-law provisions so long as the jurisdiction selected
bears some material relationship to the transaction.” Id.
143
Id. at *1.
144
Id. at *5.
145
Id.
146
Id. at *6.
147
The court pointed to the following provision of the transaction agreement dealing with
“Excluded Assets” which stated: “All rights of the Sellers under this Agreement and all
agreements and other documentation relating to the transactions contemplated hereby . . . .”
Postorivo, 2008 WL 434856, at *6 n.25.
138

GIESEL (DO NOT DELETE)

336

2/17/2018 7:40 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:309

ownership of that litigation and related privileges to the sellers.148 In all of
these cases the courts assumed that the parties could allocate control of the
attorney-client privilege by contract.
C. The Delaware Approach: Great Hill Equity Partners IV, LP v. SIG
Growth Equity Fund I, LLLP
The Delaware Court of Chancery had occasion to address the issue of
post-transaction control of the privilege for pre-transaction, transactionrelated communications in Great Hill Equity Partners IV, LP v. SIG Growth
Equity Fund I, LLLP.149 After a merger, the surviving entity sued the former
representatives of the target entity claiming that former shareholders and
other representatives had fraudulently induced the merger.150 The surviving
entity sought to rely on communications it had in its possession as a result of
taking possession of the computer systems of the target in the merger—
communications that had occurred at the time of the negotiation of the
merger and which were between the former representatives of the target and
counsel for the target.151 The former representatives of the target claimed
that those communications were protected by the attorney-client privilege
and that they, not the surviving entity, controlled the privilege as to those
transformational transaction communications.152
The court noted that the applicable Delaware statute provided that after
a merger, “all property, rights, privileges, powers and franchises, and all and
every other interest shall be thereafter as effectually the property of the
surviving or resulting corporation.”153 Despite the urging of the former
representatives of the target to apply the Tekni-Plex approach, the Great Hill
court stated that it must follow the applicable Delaware statute. The court
thus held that the privilege passed to the survivor entity as a result of the
transformational transaction and that the survivor entity then controlled the
privilege for all communications involving the target, even those relating to
the transformational transaction itself.154 This result is consistent with the
view of control of the privilege stated in the Weintraub opinion.

148

Id. at *7–8.
80 A.3d 155 (Del. Ch. 2013).
150
Id. at 155–56.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id. (quoting DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 259).
154
Id. at 158–60. The court refused to create a judicial exception to the statute. “That
sort of micro-surgery on a clear statute is not an appropriate act for a court to take.” Id. at
160.
149
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The Great Hill court then noted that the rule that control of the privilege
travels with control of the entity can be modified by the parties to the
transaction by contract.155 In other words, in the court’s opinion the statutory
rule relied upon by the court is a default rule if the parties have not otherwise
allocated control of the privilege.156 While refusing to make an exception to
the statute on the basis of the relationship of the communications to the
transaction, the court, in effect, made an exception to the statute by
recognizing the ability of the parties to transactions to modify the statute’s
reach.
Noting that parties to transactions already commonly provide for
control of the privilege to reside somewhere other than with the surviving
entity,157 the Great Hill court stated: “Thus, the answer to any parties worried
about facing this predicament in the future is to use their contractual
freedom . . . to exclude from the transferred assets the attorney-client
communications they wish to retain as their own.”158 Because the former
representatives of the target in the Great Hill matter had not provided for
control of the privilege in the transaction documents, the court refused to
create such a result. The court stated: “Seller did not carve out from the
assets transferred to the surviving corporation any pre-merger attorney-client
communications, and this court will not unilaterally read such a carve out
into the parties’ contract.”159 Because control of the privilege passed to the
survivor entity, there was no waiver as the result of the survivor having
access to the communications.160
155

Great Hill, 80 A.3d at 161.
See id. at 162 (“Absent such an express carve out, the privilege over all pre-merger
communications—including those relating to the negotiation of the merger itself—passed to
the surviving corporation in the merger, by plain operation of clear Delaware statutory law
under § 259 of the DGCL.”).
157
Id. at 161. The court noted that in Postorivo v. AG Paintball Holdings, Inc., Nos.
2991-VCP, 3111-VCP, 2008 WL 343856 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 2008), the transformational
transaction documents stated that control of the privilege for communications relating to the
transaction did not pass to the surviving entity with the completion of the transaction. Id. The
Great Hill court referred to the Postorivo asset purchase agreement which identified
“Excluded Assets” as “all rights of the Sellers under this Agreement and all agreements and
other documentation relating to the transactions contemplated hereby.” Id. at 161 n.27.
158
Great Hill, 80 A.3d at 161.
159
Id. at 162. Armed with the communications between the former representatives of the
target and counsel relating to the transformational transaction, the surviving corporation’s
claims of fraudulent misrepresentation survived a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
See Great Hill Equity Partners IV, LP v. SIG Growth Equity Fund I, LLLP, No. 7906-VCG,
2014 WL 6703980 (Del. Ch. Nov. 26, 2014). See also NewSpring Mezzanine Capital II, L.P.
v. Hayes, No. 14-1706, 2014 WL 6908058, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2014) (applying federal
privilege law, the court found that the parties did not allocate the privilege by agreement and
that the privilege passed with control of the entity).
160
Great Hill, 80 A.3d at 162. In transformational transactions, the surviving entity often
takes possession of the communications history of the target, in hard or virtual form, including
156
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V. THE RESPONSE TO UNCERTAINTY: CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS
DEALING WITH CONTROL OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The Great Hill court openly encouraged parties in transformational
transactions to allocate control of the attorney-client privilege by contract.
Other courts such as the Tekni-Plex court seem to accept contractual
privilege allocation. Commentators have likewise encouraged the use of
contractual provisions allocating control of the attorney-client privilege apart
from control of the entity.161
Indeed, transacting parties, or at least their attorneys, have responded.
Many transactional documents now address the issue of control of the
privilege.162 For example, a recent equity purchase agreement attempts to
the communications between the target and counsel regarding the transformational
transaction. See, e.g., Lynx Servs. Ltd. v. Horstman, No. 3:14-cv-01967, 2016 WL 4565895
(N.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2016). In Lynx, “substantially all” of the assets of two entities were
transferred including servers containing otherwise privileged emails. Id. at *2. The court,
however, refused to find that the sale of assets created a shift of control of the entity and so
control of the privilege did not shift to the purchaser. Id. Because the purchaser did not
control the privilege but had possession of the communications, the privilege was waived. Id.
at *3. See also Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. WH-TV Broad. Corp., No. 01-c-4366, 2003 WL
21911066 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2003) (communications transferred with assets to the purchaser
but the asset purchase did not effect a change of control of the entity and so control of the
privilege did not travel with the assets; disclosure of the communications to the purchaser
waived the privilege); In re In-Store Advertising Secs. Litig., 163 F.R.D. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(communications transferred to purchaser of assets but control of the privilege did not pass to
the purchaser so the privilege was waived). But see Postorivo v. AG Paintball Holdings, Inc.,
Nos. 2991-VCP, 3111-VCP, 2008 WL 343856, at *4 n.13 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 2008) (parties
argued that to the extent communications passed to the asset purchaser on servers which
passed to the asset purchaser, any privilege for those communications was waived; court
refused to find waiver because the seller did not “deliberately and voluntarily relinquish the
right to assert their claims of privilege”); Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 255
F.R.D. 98, 107–08 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (the court applied the New York approach to find that the
privilege did not travel to the surviving entity yet the court did not find a waiver though the
communications were on computers that the survivor controlled after the transaction but
remote from the survivor’s true access).
161
See, e.g., Edna Selan Epstein, Acquisition and Merger: Whose Privilege is it Now?, 42
LITIG. 8, 9 (Winter 2016) (“What can companies in these situations do to eliminate any
uncertainty surrounding which entity can claim the privilege or to circumvent the default rule?
Address the issue in the transactional documents[.]”); W. Brantley Phillips, Jr. & Joseph B.
Crace, Jr., Preserving the Attorney-Client Privilege in Change-of-Control Transactions, 19
M&A LAWYER 2 (Oct. 2015) (“[T]he parties should . . . clearly define the scope of any
retention of control by the seller and its controlling shareholders.”); Roxanne L. Houtman,
Delaware Insider: Great Hill: To the Survivor Goes the Privilege?, BUS. L. TODAY 1, 2 (Mar.
2014) (“In light of the Great Hill decision, where a merger transaction involves a Delaware
corporation, practitioners should consider whether it would be prudent to include in the
merger agreement language that excludes pre-merger attorney client communications from
the assets being transferred to the surviving corporation.”); Henry Sill Bryans, Business
Successors and the Transpositional Attorney-Client Relationship, 64 BUS. LAW. 1039, 1046
(Aug. 2009) (“drafting against a contrary result may be prudent”).
162
See, e.g., Xylem Inc., Share Purchase Agreement, § 10.17 (Form 8-K, Ex. 2.1) (Aug.
15, 2016); Isle of Capri Casinos Inc., Equity Purchase Agreement, § 12.17 (Form 8-K, Ex.
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recreate the Tekni-Plex result by clarifying that the seller controls the
attorney-client privilege for communications relating to the transformational
transaction. The provision states:
Buyer . . . agrees and . . . agrees to cause its Affiliates (including,
after the Closing, the Company); . . . to agree that, as to all
privileged communications between or among [law firm] and
Seller and any of its Affiliates (including, prior to the Closing, the
Company) that relate in any way to this Agreement, the
transactions contemplated hereby or the Company, its Affiliates
or any of its respective operations for the period ending at the
Closing, the attorney-client privilege and the expectation of client
confidence belongs to, and may be controlled by, Seller and will
not pass to or be claimed by Buyer or its Affiliates (including, after
the Closing, the Company).163

2.1) (Aug. 22, 2016).
An article by several attorneys who practice in the area suggests the following provision:
From and after the Effective Time, (i) the direct and indirect holders of
Company Shares immediately prior to the Effective Time (the “Former
Shareholders”) shall be the sole holders of the attorney-client privilege
with respect to the engagement of [Seller Counsel] by the Company,
and neither the Surviving Corporation nor its Affiliates shall be a
holder thereof, (ii) to the extent that files of [Seller Counsel] in respect
of such engagement constitute property of the client, only the Former
Shareholders and their respective Affiliates (and none of Parent, the
Surviving Corporation or their respective Affiliates) shall hold such
property rights and (iii) [Seller Counsel] shall have no duty whatsoever
to reveal or disclose any such attorney-client communications or files
to Parent, the Surviving Corporation or any of their Affiliates by reason
of any attorney-client relationship between [Seller Counsel] and the
Company or any of its respective Affiliates or otherwise. This Section
is irrevocable, and no term hereof may be amended, waived or
modified, without the prior written consent of [Seller Counsel].
Lawrence Friedman, Paul Shim, & Anderson Heston, Lessons in Preserving the AttorneyClient Privilege in M&A, LAW360 (Apr. 7, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/
640166/lessons-in-preserving-the-atty-client-privilege-in-m-a.
163
Isle of Capri Casinos Inc., Equity Purchase Agreement, § 12.17 (Form 8-K, Ex. 2.1)
(Aug. 22, 2016).
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A recent transaction agreement does the same,164 but also includes a
more explicit and complete covenant that the buyer, after the transaction,
will not seek access to those communications. The provision states that the
neither the buyer nor the acquired entity “will seek to obtain such
communications, whether by seeking a waiver of the attorney-client
privilege or through other means.” The agreement further states that neither
the buyer nor the acquired entity “may use or rely on any such Privileged
Communications . . . .” In addition, the provision included a waiver by the
buyer of any privilege with regard to the transaction-specific
communications. The waiver provision states: “Acquiror waives and will
not assert, and agree to cause its Affiliates (including any Acquired Entity)
to waive and not to assert, any attorney-client privilege with respect to such
Privileged Communication.”165
Another recently-used provision is more specific about exactly who has
control of the privilege after the transaction occurs.166 The provision states
that after the transaction the privilege and the expectation of client
confidence “belong to the Securityholders and may be controlled by the
Representative on behalf of the Securityholders . . . .”167 “Securityholders”
is defined as stockholders, option holders, and warrant holders, and the
representative is identified as a particular individual.168
VI. IS CONTROL OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE A PROPER SUBJECT
FOR CONTRACT ALLOCATION?
A. The Privilege Should Not Be Alienable by Contract
Several circumstances of the current deal climate bring to the fore the
very basic question of whether control of the attorney-client privilege is a
proper subject of contract allocation. The first circumstance is that parties,
164

Equinix Inc., Transaction Agreement Section 4.08 states in part:
As to all communications among counsel for Seller and/or its Affiliates
(including Jones Day and in-house counsel of Seller and/or its
Affiliates), Seller and any Affiliate of Seller that relate in any way to
this Agreement or the transactions contemplated by this Agreement or
to any Excluded Assets, Excluded Liabilities or Excluded Business
(collectively, the “Privileged Communications”), the attorney-client
privilege and the expectation of client confidence belongs to Seller and
may be controlled by Seller and will not pass to or be claimed by
Acquiror, any Acquired Entity or any of their respective Affiliates.
Equinix Inc., Transaction Agreement, § 4.08 (Form 8-K, Ex. 2.1) (Dec. 6, 2016).
165
Id.
166
Stamps.com Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger Section 9.18 (Form 10-Q, Ex. 10.1)
(Aug. 9, 2016).
167
Id.
168
Stamps.com Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger Section 1.1 (Form 10-Q, Ex. 10.1)
(Aug. 9, 2016).
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with some frequency, are including contractual provisions that purport to
allocate control of the attorney-client privilege. The second circumstance is
that some courts assume that parties to transformational transactions may
allocate control by contract. It is easy to understand how parties and
attorneys, dealing with transactions in which clients’ assets, tangible and
intangible, are allocated, might assume that the privilege is something that
can be allocated along with the other assets of the target on lists of included
and excluded assets in the transaction. Yet, the nature of the privilege is
different, and its alienability should be viewed differently as well.
Control of the attorney-client privilege may pass with control of the
entity and thus is alienable as a part of transfer of control of an entity. But
control of the privilege should not be viewed as an asset that can be
transferred by contract separate from the transfer of control of the entity. The
attorney-client privilege should not be an asset that can be bought and sold
or transferred at the whim of private parties. As one commentator has stated
when addressing transfer of the privilege for natural persons, a transfer of
the privilege “is more than a purely private transaction []” and “privileges
are not mere private ‘commodities.’”169 Rather, in any transaction involving
the privilege, there is a third party, the public, whose interests must be
considered. The public’s interest in the justice system itself must be
weighed. As Justice Arthur H. Goldberg stated in congressional testimony
regarding privilege law in the 1970s, privilege law “is the concern of the
public at large. . . . [Privileges] relate to the fundamental rights of
citizens.”170
The justice system has as its goal, ultimately, justice by a system that
reliably ferrets out the truth in the adversarial arena of the courts. It is in the
public interest that the court system achieves that overarching public benefit.
Though the attorney-client privilege hinders the truth-finding mission of the
courts, the privilege is recognized as a needed obstacle in the process. The

169
Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Alienability of Evidentiary Privileges: Of Property and
Evidence, Burden and Benefit, Hearsay and Privilege, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 497, 511–12
(2006).
170
Testimony of Arthur H. Goldberg, Rules of Evidence, Special Subcom. On Reform of
Fed. Crim. Laws, H. Comm. On the Judiciary, H.R. Rep., 93 Cong., 1st Sess. 142, 143–44
(1973) (quoted in EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES
§1:1 (3d Ed. 2017). See also 120 CONG. REC. 93-650 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974), where
Representative Hungate stated in the discussion of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence:
Rules of privilege keep out of litigation relevant and material
information. They do so because of a substantive policy judgment that
certain values—such as preserving confidential relationships—
outweigh the detrimental effect that excluding the information has on
the judicial truthfinding process. In short, rules of privilege reflect a
substantive policy choice between competing values, and this policy
choice is legislative in nature.
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privilege exists because of the recognized value of every person having
access to the best advice of an attorney so that the person may adapt the
person’s conduct to abide by the law. It is a right created and bestowed for
this societal goal. The motivational purpose shows respect for the client as
an individual actor in control of his, her, or its own path but is ultimately in
the service of the modern rationale of the privilege: encouraging the client to
disclose all to the attorney so that the attorney may provide the best possible
representation to the client within the truth-finding process, and so the client
may then understand how to abide within the law and interact with the justice
system because society is made better in that instance. The attorney-client
privilege is thus a delicate balance of several policies. Its definition and
application set that balance.
Because of this pas de deux involving the policy behind the privilege
and the larger-scoped public policy of a truth-finding justice system, any
decision regarding control of the privilege should not be the creature of
contractual allocation but rather should be fully-recognized as a policy
decision, which should be the result of careful judicial or legislative
contemplation. For example, in Weintraub, the United States Supreme Court
evaluated the policies at play and concluded that the control of the privilege
should travel with control of the entity. While the entity continues to exist,
though with different management, it has a confidentiality interest to be
protected even though the continuing of the privilege in time means that the
truth-finding mission of the courts continues to be hindered. But the
Weintraub court determined that recognizing the transfer of the privilege
along with the transfer of control was the correct balance of the interests.171
Logically, the entity that continues the existence of the target or asset
seller should be the controller of the privilege for privileged communications
that involved the target or asset seller before the transaction. The
management team of that survivor or asset purchaser should make decisions
regarding privilege with consideration for what is best for the entity just as
that team should make decisions regarding all issues with consideration for
what is best for the entity.172 Linking control of the entity and control of the
privilege is logical.
Parties to transactions should not have the power to reset the balance
set by courts and legislatures as those bodies have defined the privilege and
its parameters. In Zenith Electronics Corporation v. WH-TV Broadcasting

171

See discussion supra Part III.B.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348–49 (1985)
(“The managers, of course, must exercise the privilege in a manner consistent with their
fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation and not of themselves as
individuals.”).
172
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Corporation,173 the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois agreed that the privilege should not be alienable by contractual
provision.174 The court faced a situation in which Zenith sold certain assets
relating to a division of its business and transferred the documents relating
to the business division to the buyer. Later, in litigation with a third-party,
the buyer claimed attorney-client privilege protection for the documents
transferred to it and related to the acquired business division.175 The court
determined that control of the corporation did not pass in the asset transaction
and so control of the privilege related to the assets did not pass to the buyer
as a matter of law.176 The buyer argued that even so, the parties had, by
contract, agreed that control of the privilege was transferred to the buyer in
that the asset purchase agreement stated that the buyer was purchasing “[a]ll
intangible personal property to the extent used or held for use in the conduct
of the Business (including, without limitation, . . . all rights, privileges,
claims, causes of action and options relating to or pertaining to the Business
or the Assets) . . . .”177 The court refused to give any weight to the contractual
provision, stating: “[t]he court concludes that Zenith’s attorney-client
privilege simply was not a property right that could be sold.”178
The confidentiality requirement and its related waiver concept
accentuate the inherent utilitarian impossibility of contractual alienability of
the privilege. The definition of the privilege carries with it a requirement
that the client intend the communication to be confidential. The waiver
doctrine links to this confidentiality requirement so that any disclosure of an
otherwise privileged communication to a stranger to the communication acts
as a waiver of the privilege. In such a situation, the disclosing party has
indicated that confidentiality is not needed and so the ill effects of the
privilege on the truth-finding mission of the justice system can be avoided
by finding a waiver of the privilege. When a transformational transaction
occurs, control of the entity, the original client, passes to the surviving entity
controlled by new and different management. That new management
controls the privilege on behalf of the entity. If, as part of the transaction,
the control of the privilege is given to former shareholders of the target or
some other representative of the pre-transaction entity who was not a part of
173

No. 01-c-4366, 2003 WL 21911066 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2003).
Id. at *2.
175
Id. at *1.
176
Id.
177
Id. (quoting the Asset Purchase Agreement).
178
Id. at *2. In UTStarcom, Inc. v. Starent Networks, Corp., No. 07-c-2582, 2009 WL
4908579 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2009), the court agreed that the attorney-client privilege is not an
asset that can be sold. Id. at *3. Because the court determined that the privilege transferred
with the change of control of the entity, its holding did not rely on its conclusion about the
transferability of the privilege by contract. Id. at *5.
174
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the management team of the target entity, the privileged communications are
being shared outside of the bounds of the privilege’s definition; those former
shareholders, for example, were never within the bounds of the privilege.
The privilege is waived. With regard to representatives of the target who
were part of the managing control group of the target, one might argue that
even though those individuals were privy to the entity’s privileged
communications in which they were involved, allowing them access to the
communications after those representatives are no longer acting for the entity
is waiver. After the transaction those individuals are strangers to the
communications and the entity.179
The Zenith court noted the interplay of the waiver doctrine in the midst
of the attempted contractual allocation of the privilege. The Zenith court was
unwilling to allow the parties to thwart the protection to the system of justice
provided by the waiver doctrine by contractually transferring control.180
In addition, a system in which control of the privilege can be separated
not only from control of the entity but also allocated to others in pieces and
parts is an impossible system for courts to administer. In American
International Specialty Lines Insurance Company v. NWI-I, Inc.,181 the court
reviewed a situation in which two documents granted to two different parties
control of the privilege as it related to the assets transferred to those
entities.182 The court reasoned that control of the privilege was “an incident
of control of the corporation.”183 While acknowledging that a transfer of

179
The communications involving a member of management of the target and counsel
about the transaction are communications of the target entity and counsel. The individual has
no protected interest in them or control over them. See In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman
Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986) (the entity controls the privilege: the
individual has no control unless the attorney represented the individual as such). See
generally Grace M. Giesel, Upjohn Warnings, the Attorney-Client Privilege, and Principles
of Lawyer Ethics: Achieving Harmony, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 109 (2010) (discussing the fact
that the entity controls the privilege, not the individual employee).
180
Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. WH-TV Broad. Corp., No. 01-c-4366, 2003 WL 21911066, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2003).
181
240 F.R.D. 401 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
182
Id. at 404. The documents were specific with regard to the privilege. Both documents
stated:
In connection with the rights, claims and causes of action that
constitute the [Successor Liquidation Trust Assets or the Custodial
Trust Assets], any attorney-client privilege, work-product privilege, or
other privilege or immunity attaching to any documents or
communications (whether written or oral) transferred to the [SLT or
CT] shall vest in the [SLT or CT] and its representatives, and the
Parties are authorized to take all necessary actions to effectuate the
transfer of such privileges.
Id.
183
Id. at 406.
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assets can effectuate a change of control of an entity,184 the court determined
that despite the contractual allocation, neither of the entities was a successor
of the old entity’s business and so neither controlled the privilege for any
communications related to the assets transferred.185
The privilege is not an incident of an asset, nor is it an asset unto itself.
Rather, the privilege is an incident of the relationship of counsel with the
entity and passes when control of an entity passes. As long as the entity
continues, the privilege stays with the entity—even though those in control
of the entity may change. Courts that allow parties to allocate control of the
privilege by contract apart from control of the entity are protecting the parties
to the transaction and their freedom to contract at the expense of the public
interest in the privilege.186 A more appropriate approach is to find such
184

Id.
Id. at 407 (“Absent control of the corporation, this Court finds that the attorney-client
privilege does not pass to a successor entity, even with respect to the assets that were
transferred to that successor.”). The court denied control of the privilege that a third successor
to the original entity claimed as well because that entity did not emerge from bankruptcy with
control of the old entity’s business. Id. at 408.
186
For example, the court in Postorivo v. AG Paintball Holdings, Inc., Nos. 2991, 3111,
2008 WL 343856 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 2008), disagreed on the question of whether control of the
privilege can be chopped into segments and transferred by contract apart from control of the
entity. In a sale of “substantially all” of the assets of an entity, the sellers retained the right to
a particular piece of litigation. The asset buyers later claimed control of the privilege with
regard to pre-transaction communications related to that litigation even though the transaction
agreement allocated that control to the asset sellers. The buyers argued that control of the
privilege cannot be allocated by contract in parts but rather passes with control of the entity.
The Postorivo court refused to hold that the privilege cannot be allocated in parts by contract.
First, the court determined that the practical problem of sorting out privilege questions when
the privilege has been divided and allocated to many parties was not present in the situation
before it. In addition, the court reasoned that “it makes more sense” that the privilege for
communications related to particular litigation should be controlled by the party controlling
the litigation. Also, the court was reticent not to enforce the contract of the parties. In this
regard, the court stated: “This Court generally eschews mandating actions contrary to the
intent explicitly reflected in freely negotiated contracts among sophisticated, well-represented
parties.” The court noted that guidance in the form of judicial decisions on this issue was
scarce. Interestingly, the Postorivo court focused on interests of the parties in controlling
their own destiny by contract, but did not consider the public interest at play as well in these
situations.
Likewise, the court in In re Flag Telecom Holdings, Ltd., Nos. 02-civ-3400, 04-civ1019, 2009 WL 5245734 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2009) refused to adopt the position that control
of the attorney-client privilege cannot be transferred by contract in segments. Id. at *10. The
parties argued that though the document transferred the attorney-client privilege,
such transfer would be unenforceable and void as a matter of law. The
individual defendants aver that the Litigation Trust Agreement could
not effectively provide for the transfer of the attorney-client privilege
because FTHL, a private party, “[did] not have the right to decide on
[its] own how the legal principles governing attorney-client privilege
should be applied in a court of law.”
Id. at *6 (alterations in original) (quoting Defs. Mem. Supp. Mot. Protective Order at 13). As
a result of a bankruptcy proceeding, a new entity continued the business of the old entity while
185
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provisions unenforceable as contrary to public policy.187
One commentator has suggested that judicial opinions which hold that
the privilege travels by operation of law as a result of a sale of assets support
the position that the attorney-client privilege is an asset, a right that can be
sold.188 However, as the commentator acknowledges, the story is not so
simple.189 When courts that recognize that a sale of assets results in a change
of control of the entity, those courts concomitantly are recognizing that the
privilege moves with the change of control. So, in a sense, the privilege can
be sold if the seller is willing to sell enough so as to sell control of the entity.
This is because courts have determined that the privilege, as a matter of
policy, should travel with entity control. These court determinations in no
way suggest that control of the privilege can be separated from control of the
entity by the contractual provisions at the whim of the parties to a transaction.
B. Support from Common Interest Jurisprudence
Refusing to honor contractual privilege allocation provisions is a stance
in accord with treatment of the common interest doctrine that is a part of
privilege jurisprudence. Courts have recognized that communications
between a client and lawyer and another party and that party’s lawyer can be
privileged if the two parties have a sufficient common interest.190 Relatedly,
otherwise privileged communications between the client and the lawyer can
a Litigation Trust Agreement gave to the Trustee of the Litigation Trust the right to litigate
the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy causes of action, collect all related documents, and control any
attorney-client privileges related to those communications. Id. at *2. While acknowledging
that the Weintraub principle would indicate that the new successor entity would control the
privilege for the entity, the court noted that there was no agreement allocating control of the
privilege in Weintraub. Id. at *7. In addition, the court stated that the case law suggested that
the court should “engage in a practical consideration of the consequences of” transfer of
control of the privilege. Id. at *9. Because the court believed that the best practical effect
was to have the entity controlling the litigation to also control the privilege, the court enforced
the agreement that awarded control of the litigation and the privilege to the entity that was not
the successor to the old entity’s business. Id. at *9. The court stated: “[w]e find it improper
to deprive an entity, in which the duty to sue officers and directors is assigned pursuant to the
Reorganization Plan, of control over the attorney-client privilege.” Id.
187
Courts have found a variety of contractual provisions to be unenforceable as contrary
to public policy. See generally GRACE MCLANE GIESEL, 15 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS:
CONTRACTS CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY § 79:1 (Joseph M. Perillo, ed. 2003); David Adam
Friedman, Bringing Order to Contracts Contrary to Public Policy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 563
(2012).
188
Bryans, supra note 129, at 1056 (“Although courts sometimes assert that the attorneyclient privilege is not a property right that can be sold, decisions such as Soverain suggest that
it can, so long as enough assets and attributes of an ongoing business are transferred.”).
189
Bryans, supra note 129, at 1056 (emphasis added) (“(I]t can be argued that Soverain,
and other decisions like it, implicitly accept the notion that the privilege is but one of the
sticks in the bundle, provided the bundle is large enough and the buyer uses the sticks to
conduct the same business that had been conducted by the seller.”).
190
See PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 4:35 (2016).
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be shared with this other party and lawyer without causing a waiver of the
privilege if the two parties have a sufficient common interest.191 These
groups often enter into agreements in which they assert a common interest
and establish their desire to work together and share information.192 Yet,
courts do not find a legally sufficient common interest solely because the
parties, by contract, agree that they share a common interest.193 The
agreement of the parties is but one reference point courts consider when
deciding whether, in fact, the parties share a legally sufficient common
interest.194 As the court stated in Cohen v. Cohen,195 when dealing with the
application of the common interest doctrine, “‘the fact that private parties
agree that something is privileged does not make it so.’”196 Likewise, in
191

See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 (Am.
Law Inst. 2000). Section 76 states:
(1) If two or more clients with a common interest in a litigated or
nonlitigated matter are represented by separate lawyers and they agree
to exchange information concerning the matter, a communication of
any such client that otherwise qualifies as privileged under §§ 68–72
that relates to the matter is privileged as against third persons. Any
such client may invoke the privilege, unless it has been waived by the
client who made the communication.
(2) Unless the clients have agreed otherwise, a communication
described in Subsection (1) is not privileged as between clients
described in Subsection (1) in a subsequent adverse proceeding
between them.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 (Am. Law Inst. 2000). See
also Grace M. Giesel, End the Experiment: The Attorney-Client Privilege Should Not Protect
Communications in the Allied Lawyer Setting, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 475 (2011-2012) (discussing
the common interest doctrine).
192
These agreements can carry many names such as joint defense agreements, common
interest agreements, and confidentiality agreements. See generally Stephen A. Messer &
Scott J. Seagle, Combining Forces: A Primer on the Joint Defense Agreement in Civil
Litigation, 30 TR. ADVOCATE Q. 7 (2011); Thomas G. Pasternak & R. David Donoghue,
Making Joint Defense Agreements Work, 34 LITIG. 26 (2008).
193
See, e.g., Cohen v. Cohen, No. 09-civ-10230, 2015 WL 745712, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
30, 2015); Brooklyn Navy Yard Cogeneration Partners, L.P. v. PMNC, 753 N.Y.S.2d 343,
345 (Sup. Ct. 2002); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 676
N.Y.S.2d 727, 733 (Sup. Ct. 1998). See also DAVID M. GREENWALD, ROBERT R. STAUFFER,
& ERIN R. SCHRANTZ, 1 TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 1:105 (3d ed. 2015) (“[T]he mere
existence of a written agreement documenting a common legal interest will not, on its own,
establish such an interest.”); Katharine Taylor Schaffzin, An Uncertain Privilege: Why the
Common Interest Doctrine Does Not Work and How Uniformity Can Fix It, 15 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 49, 82 (2005) (“[C]ourts will evaluate the existence of a common legal interest
independently from the agreement. Courts will not allow two entities to conspire to protect
non-privileged documents from disclosure to a third party simply by entering into a
confidentiality agreement.”).
194
See GREENWALD ET AL., supra note 193 (“[d]ocumenting a joint defense arrangement
increases the parties’ ability to meet their burden of proving that they were acting jointly”).
195
No. 09-civ-10230, 2015 WL 745712 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2015).
196
Id. at *4 (quoting SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Props. LLC, No. 01-civ9291, 2002 WL 1455346, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2002)).
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Aetna Casualty & Surety Company v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s
London,197 the court stated: “The law is well settled that the mere existence
of . . . cooperation agreements . . . cannot create a privilege that otherwise
does not exist. A private agreement by the parties to protect communications
cannot create a privilege.”198
A very good example of this principle exists in the midst of a discovery
dispute in Waymo LLC v. Uber Technologies, Inc.199 Waymo claimed an
employee took thousands of documents containing trade secrets with him
when he left Waymo and started his own competing business, Ottomotto.
Ottomotto passed the trade secrets to Uber when Uber purchased
Ottomotto.200 In the discovery phase of the litigation the court had the
opportunity to determine whether a due diligence report, prepared in
anticipation of Uber’s purchase of Ottomotto, is protected by the attorneyclient privilege or the work product doctrine.201 Pointing to a “Joint Defense,
Common Interest and Confidentiality Agreement,”202 the defending parties
argued that the parties shared a common interest and that the documents were
privileged.203 The magistrate judge determined that the attorney-client
privilege did not apply204 and that the parties did not share a common interest
at the time the document at issue was shared205 and so any otherwise
applicable work product protection was waived.206 The magistrate judge
stated, “[P]arties cannot create a common legal interest where none exists
merely by entering into a joint defense agreement.”207 The District Court for
the Northern District of California agreed.208

197

676 N.Y.S.2d. 727 (Sup. Ct. 1998).
Id. at 733.
199
No. 17-cv-00939, 2017 WL 2485382 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2017) [hereinafter Waymo I].
See also Waymo LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 17-cv-00939, 2017 WL 2694191 (N.D. Cal.
June 21, 2017) (Order Denying Motions for Relief from Judge Corley’s Nondispositive
Pretrial Order Re Due Diligence Report) [hereinafter Waymo II].
200
Waymo I, 2017 WL 2485382, at *1.
201
Id.
202
Id. at *3.
203
Id. More distilled versions of the arguments can be found in Waymo II, 2017 WL
269191.
204
Id. at *8.
205
Id. at *9–*11.
206
Waymo I, 2017 WL 2485382, at *13. In reviewing this determination, the court in
Waymo II noted that “Judge Corley made extensive factual findings that . . . [the parties] had
adverse rather than common interests . . . and that Uber therefore waived any work-product
privilege it may have had over the due diligence report by disclosing the contents of that report
to adversaries.” Waymo II, at *6.
207
Waymo I, 2017 WL 2485382, at *12.
208
Waymo II, 2017 WL 2694191.
198
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Just as the Waymo court and other courts have found that parties cannot
create a common interest and avoid the policy-based bounds of the attorneyclient privilege by contract, so too parties should not be able to shift control
of the privilege by contract to achieve results in contradiction to the policy
and parameters of the privilege. The attorney-client privilege is a creature
of the justice system and, in particular, the relationship of attorney and client;
it is not an asset owned by contracting parties.
C. An Argument by Analogy: Contractual Extensions of Statutes of
Limitations Are Not Enforceable
Contractual allocation of control of the attorney-client privilege should
be treated as courts and legislatures treat contractual extension of statutes of
limitations. Courts have recognized that statutes of limitations protect the
justice system and defendants from being required to deal with fraudulent
claims or simply old claims supported with stale evidence.209 Courts have
refused to honor contractual agreements whose effect is to extend statutes of
limitations when those agreements were entered into before any cause of
action accrued.210 These courts recognize that in extending the statute of
209
“The principal purpose of statutes of limitations is to eliminate stale or fraudulent
claims.” W. Gate Vill. Ass’n v. Dubois, 761 A.2d 1066, 1071 (N.H. 2000) (citing Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 549 A.2d 1187, 1192 (N.H. 1988)). The West Gate court also stated:
Absent such statutes, a dilatory plaintiff might burden a defendant with
suits of which he was not timely informed, and clog dockets,
interfering with the “orderly administration of justice.” Statutes of
limitations reflect the fact that it becomes more difficult and timeconsuming both to defend against and to try claims as evidence
disappears and memories fade with the passage of time. Such statutes
thus represent the legislature’s attempt to achieve a balance among
State interests in protecting both . . . courts and defendants generally
against stale claims and in insuring a reasonable period during which
plaintiffs may seek recovery on otherwise sound causes of action.
Id. at 1070 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 549 A.2d 1187, 1192 (N.H. 1988)).
See also John J. Kassner & Co. v. City of New York, 389 N.E.2d 99, 103 (N.Y. 1979) (quoting
Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 248 N.E.2d 871, 872 (N.Y. 1969)) (“Although the
Statute of Limitations is generally viewed as a personal defense ‘to afford protection to
defendants against defending stale claims,’ it also expresses a societal interest or public policy
‘of giving repose to human affairs’”); Shaw v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 395 A.2d 384, 386 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1978) (quoting Boston v. Bradley’s Ex’r, 4 Del. 524, 526 (Del. Super. Ct. 1847))
(stating statutes of limitations “afford a security against the prosecution of claims where, from
lapse of time, the circumstances showing the true nature or state of the transaction, may have
been forgotten; or may be incapable of explanation by reason of the uncertainty of human
testimony, the death or removal of witnesses, or the loss of receipts, vouchers, or other
papers”).
210
See, e.g., Xerox State & Local Solutions, Inc. v. Xchanging Solutions (USA) Inc., 216
F. Supp. 3d 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (applying New York law; contractual provisions valid only
if made after the cause of action accrues); In re Slaey, 539 B.R. 500 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2015)
(applying Virginia law; agreements not to plead the statute of limitations are void); Wirth v.
Seitz, C.A. No. N14C-07-013, 2016 WL 1591052 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 15, 2016) (provision
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limitations by contract the two parties to the contract are acting in their own
interest. No party to the contract however, is considering the interest of the
public and the effect of the agreement on the public policy of the state as
manifested by the legislature in the statute of limitations.211 The legislature
has considered the various interests involved and has set the appropriate
balance with the statute of limitations.212 As the Delaware Superior Court
stated in Shaw v. Aetna Life Insurance Company213 with regard to a
contractual extension of the statute of limitations, “[t]wo parties contracting
between themselves cannot agree to circumvent the law as mandated by the
legislature in its attempt to protect the public interests.”214
Similarly, the New York court stated in John J. Kassner & Company v.
City of New York215 that an agreement entered into before a cause of action
accrues and whose effect is to extend a statute of limitations “is
unenforceable because a party cannot ‘in advance, make a valid promise that
a statute founded in public policy shall be inoperative.’”216 And in refusing
a contractual extension made before the accrual of a cause of action, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court in West Gate Village Association v. Dubois217
noted that the party was “seeking to circumvent the legislature’s declaration
of public policy.”218
Some states go so far as to bar contractual extension of statutes of
limitations by statute.219 Every state that has adopted Uniform Commercial
Code section 2-725(1) bars such extension regarding the sale of goods. That
provision states in part: “By the original agreement the parties may reduce

lengthening statute contrary to public policy); Munday v. Mayfair Diagnostic Lab., 831
S.W.2d 912 (Ky. 1992) (applying Kentucky law; contractual provisions valid only if made
after the cause of action accrues).
211
See John J. Kassner & Co., 389 N.E.2d at 103 (“Because of the combined private and
public interests involved, individual parties are not entirely free to waive or modify the
statutory defense.”).
212
See, e.g., Shaw v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 395 A.2d 384, 386–87 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978)
(legislature adopted statute of limitations “in its attempt to protect the public interest”).
213
395 A.2d 384 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978).
214
Id. at 387.
215
389 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1979).
216
Id. at 103 (quoting Shapley v. Abbott, 42 N.Y. 443, 452 (1870)).
217
761 A.2d 1066 (N.H. 2000).
218
Id. at 1071.
219
See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-5. That provision states:
The limitations prescribed in this chapter shall not be changed in any
way whatsoever by contract between parties, and any change in such
limitations made by any contracts stipulation whatsoever shall be
absolutely null and void, the object of this section being to make the
period of limitations for the various causes of action the same for all
litigants.
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the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.”220
Courts should take the same approach with contractual attempts to
allocate control of the attorney-client privilege. Any such provisions should
be found unenforceable as contrary to public policy.221
VII. CONCLUSION
In the context of entity transactions such as mergers and sales of assets,
parties to those transformational transactions seek to control their own
destiny with regard to many issues. In these transactions the question of
control of the attorney-client privilege for communications between the
target or asset seller and counsel that occurred before the transformation is
an important one and is even more important with regard to transactionrelated communications. Parties to transformational transactions have begun
to allocate control of the privilege in their deal agreements. Some courts
have accepted this and some have even encouraged such action.
Honoring these provisions disrespects the attorney-client privilege.
The privilege represents a balance of policies that has been set by courts and
legislatures. These are institutions capable of balancing the interests of
individual entities as well as the interests of the public in a just and fair justice
system. Parties to a transaction, motivated by their own self-interest and
without regard for the public interest, should not be allowed to define the
parameters or application of the privilege. Control of the privilege should
not be alienable by contract apart from control of the entity. Indeed, the
waiver concept itself, a part of the privilege parameters, is inconsistent with
allowing parties to a transaction to allocate control of the privilege by
contract. Practically, allowing parties to transactions to allocate the privilege
apart from control of the entity opens the door to parsing the privilege into
as many pieces as the parties might desire. Such a system of privilege control
is surely unworkable.
Refusing to allow parties to allocate control of the privilege by contract
is consistent with judicial holdings in which courts refuse to view agreements
that state that the parties share a common interest as dispositive of the
question. Indeed, the law occasionally recognizes doctrines of the justice
system and law that are not the proper subject of private contracts because
those doctrines carry with them interests greater than the interests of the
parties to the contract. For example, courts have held that parties to a
contract, even one that is part of a transformational transaction, cannot agree
that the statute of limitations for a dispute that has yet to arise between the
220

U.C.C. § 2-725(1).
See GRACE MCLANE GIESEL, 15 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: CONTRACTS CONTRARY TO
PUBLIC POLICY § 83:8 (Joseph M. Perillo, ed. 2003) (discussing courts’ treatment of
contractual provisions extending statutes of limitations).
221
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parties is a longer time than that set by law. The attorney-client privilege,
like the statute of limitations, is a doctrine whose raison d’etre is larger than
the interests of the parties to a particular contract or transaction. Control of
the privilege should not be alienable by contract apart from control of the
entity. Any such provisions should be unenforceable as contrary to public
policy.

